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Convergence and Divergence in post-Cold War British, French and German 
Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy 
 
Post-Cold War military reforms in Britain, France and Germany have been 
characterized by patterns of convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional 
forums of defense policy, but by divergence in temporality. These patterns of convergence 
and divergence cannot be fully explained by cultural approaches. Neither can they be 
explained solely by a focus on the role of ‘international structure’, as neo-realism posits, 
although the post-Cold War distribution of capabilities is driving Britain, France and 
Germany towards policy convergence. Instead the analysis builds upon the insights of 
neoclassical realism and its emphasis upon ‘state power’ by demonstrating the important 
intervening role played by domestic material power relationships in incentivizing figures 
within the core executive to respond to systemic power shifts. The article argues that in 
Britain and France ‘executive autonomy’ in defense policy, resulting from the unitary 
state, weak linkages between defense and social policy subsystems and formal powers of 
the core executive in defense has allowed policy leaders to focus on the ‘national 
interest’ and convergence with ‘systemic imperatives’. In Germany the federal system 
and linkages between social and defense policy circumscribed ‘executive autonomy’ in 
defense policy and incentivized an acute concern within the core executive about the 
domestic political ramifications of convergence with systemic imperatives, leading to the 
temporal management of reform, producing short-medium term policy stasis. Culture 
emerges not so much as a cause of action as instrumental and a resource for policy 
leaders in the domestic political and temporal management of reform. 
 
This article examines patterns of convergence and divergence in post-Cold War 
British, French and Germany military reforms and finds that it is possible to identify 
increasing levels of convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of 
defense policy. However, it uncovers significant divergence in the temporality of reform 
processes.1 The study argues that these patterns of convergence/divergence cannot be 
explained through a focus on the mediating role played by ‘national strategic cultures’ – 
‘culturally-bounded’ and ‘institutionally-embedded’ norms that ‘predispose societies in 
general and political elites to certain patterns of behavior’.2 They cannot be understood 
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through an examination of the role of ‘political/norm entrepreneurs’ within the core 
executive or actors within the wider security policy subsystem3, in reshaping the three 
layers of belief systems (peripheral, operational and central beliefs) of which strategic 
cultures are composed.4 Nor is an examination of the impact of civil-military relations on 
the organizational culture of defense ministries and military establishments a sufficient 
account of policy change.5 ‘Culture’ emerges not so much as a cause of action  as a tool, 
resource and instrument for policy leaders concerned with the domestic political and 
temporal management of reform. 
The analysis finds that ‘international structure’ is the key source of change and 
convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy.6 
However, neo-realist accounts neglect the impact of domestic political factors in 
constraining the autonomy of the core executive to respond to systemic power shifts over 
the short-medium term and cannot adequately account for temporal divergence in 
military reform amongst states of broadly comparable relative material power capabilities 
and ‘external vulnerability’.7 Hence neoclassical realism, that emphasizes the primacy of 
‘international structure’, but also integrates the intervening role played by ‘unit-level 
variables’, such as domestic power relationships and strategic leadership, emerges as the 
most convincing account of convergence/divergence in military reform.8  
                                                
3 A policy subsystem refers to a ‘group of people and or organizations interacting regularly over periods of 
a decade or more to influence policy formulation and implementation within a give policy area/domain’. 
See Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment”, in 
Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 135. 
4 Central beliefs are ‘abstract beliefs and basic assumptions about the international system…rarely 
questioned and stable’; ‘operational beliefs’ relate to the ‘efficacy of different policy instruments and 
strategies’, whilst ‘peripheral beliefs’ are ‘more transient and concern concrete issues and objects’. See 
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace-Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2006), 13. Kerry Longhurst terms the three layers of beliefs of which strategic culture are composed 
‘foundational elements’, ‘security policy standpoints’ and ‘regulatory practices’. See Kerry Longhurst, 
Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy: 1990-2003 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004), 17. Paul A. Sabatier also argues that advocacy coalitions are 
structured by three layers of beliefs: ‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’. See Sabatier, “The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment”, 113.  
5 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 4. 
6 On international structure and ‘clustered convergence’, see Joao Resende-Santos, Neoeralism, States and 
the Modern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 78.  On ‘international structure 
and convergence’ see also Galia Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity,” 
Security Studies 15, no.2 (spring 2006): 271-309; Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st 
Century: The Challenge of Multi-Polarity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Seth Jones, The Rise of European 
Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of 
Military Doctrine: Britain, France and German Between the Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984);   
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), 127.  
7 Barry R. Posen (2006: 156) classifies Britain, France and Germany second-rank, ‘consequential’ states, of 
similar relative material power, which combined with their similar geographical location leads to a 
comparable level of ‘external vulnerability’. See Barry Posen, “The European Security and Defence Policy: 
Response to Uni-polarity,” Security Studies 15, no.2 (spring 2006): 156. On ‘external vulnerability’ see 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive 
State,” Security Studies 15, no.3 (summer 2006): 467; 479.  
8 On Neoclassical Realism see: Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 
World Politics 51, no.3 (autumn 1998): 144-72; Sten Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: 
Decisionmakers Between International Power and Domestic Interests,” Security Studies 11, no.2 (winter 
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As Zakaria argues: ‘Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its 
government. Consequently what matters is state power, not national power. State power 
is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects 
the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends’.9 Taliaferro 
highlights how states which are confronted with the same threat vary in their ability to 
extract and mobilize resources from domestic society: unit–level variables – state 
institutions, ideology and nationalism – affect whether and when states choose 
innovation, emulation or the continuation of existing military strategies.10 This article 
responds to the research agenda outlined by Sten Rynning11, and Gideon Rose12 by 
focusing specifically on the impact of different state structures and domestic material 
power relationships on the extraction and deployment of national power by state leaders 
and by testing neoclassical realism against cultural approaches to strategic adjustment. 
In his study of French military reform, Rynning posits that the key unit-level 
variable in explaining temporal divergence with systemic power shifts is the ability of 
policy leaders to successfully manage domestic reform processes.13 However, whilst it is 
important to analyze the impact of specific instances of policy leadership, in order to 
fully understand the root causes of temporal divergence, we must look instead to the 
domestic material incentives that determine the initial choice of leadership role. The level 
of ‘executive autonomy’ in defense policy, resulting from the institutional structure of the 
state (the degree of centralization), the formal constitutional powers of the core executive 
over defense policy and nested and interlinked policy subsystems 
(defense/budgetary/social policy) incentivizes or discourages political entrepreneurship 
by policy leaders on behalf of ‘third-order’14 change and the ‘timely’ translation of 
systemic power shifts into military reform15.      
 The article argues that high levels of ‘executive autonomy’16 in defense policy 
                                                                                                                                            
2001/02): 85-116; Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State”. This contrasts to 
Innenpolitik approaches, which attach causal weight to domestic politics in driving foreign and defense 
policy. See Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany 1894-1901 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International 
Ambition (Ithaca: New York, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” 
International Security 7, no.1 (spring 1991): 180-81.     
9 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 9. 
10 Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” 465-68. 
11 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 116.  
12 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 169. 
13 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests.” 
14 Peter Hall defines three levels of policy change: ‘first-order change’ in which the settings of policy 
instruments are changed, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain constant; second-order 
change in which both the instruments and settings of policy are altered, while the goals of policy remain 
unchanged and finally ‘third-order change’, in which all three components of policy – settings, instruments 
and the hierarchy of goals – are transformed. See Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the 
State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain,” Comparative Politics 25, no.3 (autumn, 1993): 
278-9. 
15 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 115-16. 
16 It is important to note that periods of ‘cohabitation’ in France can lower ‘executive autonomy’ and create 
incentives for the temporal management of reform. 
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help explain the temporal location, sequencing and pace of military reform in the UK and 
France.17 However, the case of Bundeswehr (German armed forces) reform highlights 
that whilst policy over the long-run is dictated by the threats and opportunities presented 
by the international system, deficits in ‘executive autonomy’ can lead to the active 
promotion of ‘stasis’ and ‘first-order change’ in military reform over the short-medium 
term. Within such a context ‘culture’ is used selectively by policy leaders as a resource 
with which to legitimate policy stasis as part of the domestic political and temporal 
management of reform.18 This preoccupation with ‘balancing domestic power’19 and the 
domestic political ramifications of convergence with systemic change, rather than the 
‘national interest’, also impacts upon the anchoring of defense policy within EU/NATO 
‘allied cooperation’, determining whether this will reflect systemic imperatives or 
domestic interests over the short-medium term.20 Hence ‘executive autonomy’, rather 
than strategic culture, or specific instances of policy leadership, forms the decisive causal 
variable in explaining temporal divergence in military reform. 
The article begins by briefly examining the empirical evidence of convergence in 
British, French and German defense policy. It proceeds by outlining the core premises of 
cultural and realist approaches to convergence and by testing their utility through case 
studies of the reform processes in these three states.  
 
Patterns of Convergence and Divergence in Military Reform 
 
According to Bennett, policy convergence represents ‘a process of ‘becoming’ 
rather than a condition of ‘being’ alike…there must be movement over time to some 
common point. In comparative research…the essential theoretical dimension is temporal 
rather than spatial’.21 Knill offers a more substantive definition, arguing that policy 
convergence is ‘any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a 
certain policy…across a given set of political jurisdictions…over a given period of time. 
                                                
17 Although, as the analysis will also demonstrate, the opacity of systemic imperatives emerges as an 
important additional factor determining the initial short-term temporal lag between systemic power shifts 
and military reform in states with high levels of executive autonomy. Whilst the uncertainty is an inherent 
feature of the international system, the problem of imperfect information is magnified following a dramatic 
shift in the balance of capabilities. States, as rational actors, must become acquainted with the opportunities 
and constraints presented by their new strategic environment. See Hyde-Price, European Security in the 
21st. Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity, 32. See also Robert Keohane on the ‘rationality assumption’ 
and realist thought: Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics”, in Neo-realism and Its Critics, ed. Robert 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 167.  
18 On the temporal management of reform processes see: Tom Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-
2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over International Opportunity,” European 
Security 14, no.3 (autumn 2005): 361-86; Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: 
Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era (New York: Berghahn, 2008). 
19 On ‘internal balancing’ see: Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between 
International Power and Domestic Interests,” 90. 
20 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the 
Post-Cold War Era, 148-82. 
21 Colin Bennett, “Review Article: What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?” British Journal of 
Political Science 21, no. 2 (summer 1991): 19.   
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Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change towards 
some common point’.22  
Building upon these broad definitions this article distinguishes between 
convergence in British, French and German military reforms along four dimensions: 
defense policy objectives (territorial and alliance defense/low- medium- high-intensity 
expeditionary crisis-management operations); policy instruments (military structures and 
capabilities); the institutional forums within which defense policy is anchored (national 
strategic autonomy or the embedding of defense policy within the EU/NATO) and finally 
temporality (the temporal location, sequence and pace of reform). 
During the Cold War West European militaries displayed strong convergence in 
policy objectives. The principles of deterrence and territorial/alliance defense stood at the 
center of British, French and German defense policy. Their policy instruments (armed 
forces) were also convergent, taking the form of mass armies, designed to resist a 
Warsaw Pact advance across the German plain (see table 1). Divergence was apparent in 
institutional forums: whilst Britain and Germany prioritized NATO, French defense 
policy, was characterized by the Gaullist principles of ‘national sanctuary’ and ‘strategic 
autonomy’, following its withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structures in 1966, 
leading to a ‘semi-detached’ defense policy.23 However, the end of the Cold War led to 
dramatic changes in the international security environment: a shift from a bi-polar to a 
uni-polar world, unilateral changes in U.S. behavior, the rise of new security threats and 
challenges such as failed states, humanitarian emergencies, international terrorism, 
organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  (WMD).24 Within 
this changing context longer-tem convergence patterns in the objectives, instruments and 
institutional forums of British, French and German defense policy are evident.  
 
Convergence in Objectives, Instruments and Institutional Forums; Divergence in 
Temporality 
 
                                                
22 Christopher Knill, “Introduction: Cross National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and 
Explanatory Factors,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no.5 (winter 2005): 768. 
23 It is important to note that, despite French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military commands the 
Ailleret-Lemnitzer and Valentin-Feber Accords of 1966-97 outlined far-reaching French participation with 
NATO states in the context of European conflict. See Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea of France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992; Anand Menon, “From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and 
European Security,” International Affairs 71, no.1 (winter 1995): 19.   
24 On the core post-Cold War security threats identified by EU and NATO member states see: ‘A Secure 
Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, pp.1-5 and The Riga Summit: A 
Reader’s Guide, 6th July, 2007, p.4. Although, as is recognized later on in the article, the objectivity of 
these security threats is challenged by the literatures on ‘securitization’ and ‘strategic culture’. On 
securitization see: Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no.2 (spring 2005): 171-205; Barry Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); 
Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of 
International Relations 13, no.3 (summer 2007): 357-83. On strategic culture and the subjective and 
nationally-specific normative and discursive processes that determine whether issues are identified as 
security threats, national defense policy objectives, the appropriate policy instruments and capability 
investment see: Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany Pacifism and Peace Enforcement; Longhurst, Germany and 
the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy: 1990-2003.  
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Britain, France and Germany display increasing convergence in the objectives of 
defense policy, having transformed the core objectives of defense policy from territorial 
and alliance defense towards a new form of ‘forward defense’:  low-medium and high 
intensity expeditionary crisis-management operations to deal with threats to international 
instability at their source. In this respect, all three states have undertaken convergence 
around the US model of expeditionary power projection, though with a stronger focus on 
low-medium intensity peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction operations.25  
Both Britain and France have also successfully enacted reforms to their policy 
instruments, notably through the creation of ‘Joint Reaction Forces’, structured 
according to the principle of modularity and in the case of France, through the abolition 
of conscription in 1996. This mirrors the U.S. integration of naval, air and land power, 
allowing the global projection of force (as part of multilateral coalitions) in support of 
low, medium and high-intensity military operations, making these states cases of ‘third-
order change’.26  However, all three states have deviated from the centralization that 
has characterized U.S. Command Structures, by employing ‘mission command’, 
permitting greater flexibility in the conduct of military operations. 
Yet, despite the development of a Joint Reaction Force and focus on NEC and 
Effects Based Operations since the 2003 VPR and 2006 Defence White Paper, 
Germany remains a case of ‘second-order change’. German reforms have proposed 
only successive alterations to the ‘settings’ of the policy instrument. Transformation is 
hindered by the retention of conscription: 37,500 basic service conscripts and 21,600 
extended service conscripts.27 This is not only a practical impediment to the 
development of an expeditionary capacity28, but also a financial burden at a time when 
funds are required for investment in capabilities to permit force projection, limiting 
Germany’s ability to contribute to medium-high intensity operations.29   
 Capability investment evidences partial convergence with the US-led 
                                                
25 Timothy Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in post-Cold 
War Europe,” International Affairs 82, no. 6 (winter 2006): 1059/75; Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and 
Society in Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50; James Sperling, “Capabilities Gaps and Traps: 
Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship?” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no.3 
(2004): 457-58. 
26 See Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82, no.4 (2003): 43 and Anthony 
King, “Towards a Transnational Europe: The Case of the Armed Forces,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 8, no.3 (2005): 321-40. However, all three states are dependent upon the multilateral pooling of 
capabilities (particularly with U.S. and its command of the ‘global commons’, in order to deploy medium-
high-intensity military power at the global level). See Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The 
Changing Nature of Military Roles in post-Cold War Europe,” 1068; see also and Barry R. Posen, 
“Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 28, no.1 
(summer 2003): 5-46. 
27 Soren Lungu, “Military Modernization and Political Choice: Germany and the US-Promoted Military 
Technological Revolution During the 1990s,” Defence and Security Analysis 20, no.1 (spring 2004): 261-
72. 
28 The 2006 German Defence White Paper recognizes that basic service conscripts will be unable to 
contribute to the ‘reaction forces’ or the ‘stabilization forces’. See White Paper 2006 on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 78-79. 
29 The 2003 reform reduced the Bundeswehr to 252,000 troops including 50,000 conscripts, capable of 
delivering 35,000 rapid reaction troops (high-intensity); a stabilization force of 70,000 (low-medium 
intensity) and 147,500 support/logistical forces. 
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Revolution in Military Affairs.30 Crucially, reform in all three states does not evidence 
the ‘technological determinism’ that has been the defining feature of post-Cold War 
U.S. military reform.31 Britain, France and Germany have undertaken a more modest 
and selective emulation of the core concepts underpinning US ‘transformation’ 
(Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Operations (EBO))32, in the form 
of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) and the Effects Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO). 
On the one hand, reforms to their capabilities, not least the acquisition of C4ISR 
and precision-guided munitions (PGM), reflects the desire to augment their capacity to 
undertake stand-off high-intensity warfighting operations against peer or near-peer 
competitors alongside the U.S. and/or each other though NATO and the EU (though only 
as part of multi-national coalitions/alliances).33 Yet on the other hand, convergence is 
also focused around the conduct of crisis-management operations that can vary in 
intensity across the conflict spectrum (‘three block war’)34 and is predicated upon the 
limitations of technology to control the process of ‘escalation’35 and transform the nature 
of conflict. Hence, where appropriate, elements of the RMA with the potential to 
supplement the capacity of the major European powers to conduct such operations, have 
been adopted, notably in areas such as Command and Control, along with the 
development of flexible and mobile medium weight infantry forces and reforms to 
command structures to permit enhanced jointness.36     
 In contrast to U.S. ‘transformation’, that has emphasized the acquisition of stand-
                                                
30 Sperling, “Capabilities Traps and Gaps,” 453-59; Soren Lungu, “The US Military-Technological 
Revolution and the ‘Europeanization’ of the French Industrial Sector During the 1990s,” RUSI Journal 
149, no.1 (spring, 2004): 58-63. 
31 Reynolds, “Building the Future Force: Challenges to Getting Military Transformation Right,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 3 (winter 2006): 435-71. 
32 On EBO see Joshua Ho, “The Dimensions of Effects Based Operations,” Defence Studies 5, no.2 (spring 
2005): 169-87; on NEC and the Effects Based Approach to Operations see J.S. Meiter, “Network Enabled 
Capabilities: A Theory Desperately in Need of Doctrine,” Defence Studies 6, no.2 (spring 2006): 189-214.  
33 Although Germany lags behind Britain and France in the development of doctrine on EBAO and in 
investment in high-technology weapons systems in support of NEC (Sperling, 2004: 457; Lungu, 2004b). 
34 The former Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995-99), General Charles Krulack argued in favor of 
developing the ability to deal with ‘three block warfare’. This encompassed the idea that U.S. forces would 
be most likely to encounter the rapid emergence of simultaneous humanitarian, peacekeeping/post-conflict 
reconstruction and high-intensity conventional warfighting operations in urban environments as small as 
‘three blocks’, though his ideas were marginalized within the Marines until 2005. See Ho, “Dimensions of 
Effects Based Operations,” 182-83; Steven Metz, “America’s Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and 
Political History,” Defence Studies 6, no.1 (spring 2006): 7; Terry Terriff, “Of Romans and Dragons: 
Preparing the U.S. Marine Corps for Counterinsurgency,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no.1 (spring 
2007): 143-62. 
35 As John Stone pertinently notes, Carl von Clausewtiz posited that in seeking to compel an adversary to 
one’s will through the destruction of his military, war would escalate to its ‘pure’ form: ‘an explosion of 
uncontrolled violence’. However, Clausewitz identified two intervening factors, political and technical, that 
temper escalation. Technology can impede escalation by enabling the rapid and decisive defeat of the 
enemy, whilst the political context of a conflict can obstruct escalation, as the level of violence in war is 
directly proportional to the political aims on behalf of which a conflict is fought. See John Stone, “Politics, 
Technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no.3 (2004): 409-18.  
36 Supported by more a modest emulation of the U.S. infantry’s ‘Future Effects System’ in Britain this has 
taken the form of the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES); in France, the Scorpion/Future Combat System. 
The German ‘Infantryman of the Future System’ is currently at an early stage of development. 
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off capabilities and development of concepts and doctrine permitting Rapid and Decisive 
Operations against peer or near peer competitors37, the focus of West European reform 
has also been upon the ability to put ‘boots on the ground’, and on ensuring the 
development of skills necessary to conduct effective COIN, peacekeeping and post-
conflict reconstruction operations. Consequently, reforms have emphasized the effective 
integration of civilian and military contributions, not only to achieving strategic effects in 
high-intensity warfighting and RDO, but also in low-medium intensity peace-support and 
post-conflict reconstruction operations (termed the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in the 
UK; the ‘Synergy’ of Effects in France).38 As Sperling highlights: ‘French and British 
[military capability] concerns complement rather than compete with one another, despite 
their different levels of trust and preference for autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S.’39  
Whilst British and French ‘third-order’ reform processes followed a similar 
temporal sequence in respect to the order of reforms to the objectives and instruments of 
policy, the ‘paradigm shift’ in French institutional forums to embeddedness within ESDP 
took place in conjunction with changes to the objectives of French defense policy in 
February 1994, well before changes to the instruments of policy, in October 1996. 
Although it is only possible to identify incremental change to the settings of British 
policy on institutional venues (in the form of the gradual embedding of British defense 
policy within ESDP following the October 1998 Saint Malo agreement), this followed a 
very different sequence to France, as the Saint Malo Initiative (October 1998) took place 
three months after the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) ended. France and Britain 
display divergence in temporal location, taking place in 1997-98 (UK)40 and 1994-96 
(France) and the reforms also differ in pace. The SDR was 14 months in duration, from 
May 1997 to July 1998. Reforms to French defense policy objectives began in February 
1994 under Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, however, reform to the policy instrument 
was finalized in October 1996 – a period of 32 months. 
Germany is a case of significant divergence in all three aspects of temporality: in 
temporal location – with a shift to crisis-management and ‘full-spectrum’ operations 
taking place in 2003 – and in sequencing, as reforms to the objectives of policy have only 
been accompanied by change to the ‘settings’ of policy instruments. On the dimension of 
pace, reform to the objectives of German policy took place over a comparatively rapid six 
month period – from May to October 2003. Finally, Germany has displayed strong 
                                                
37 See Metz, “America’s Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History”. See also Kevin P. 
Reynolds, “Building the Future Force: Challenges to Getting Military Transformation Right,” 435-71. It is 
important to note that the release of the US Army/Marines Country Insurgency Field Manual FM-24 
(December 2006) represents a notable recognition of the limitations of technology to control the process of 
‘escalation’ in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare. 
38 These concepts are intended to facilitate the full integration of the diplomatic, military, economic and 
informational dimensions of military operations. 
39 Sperling, “Capabilities Traps and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” 
457. However, despite the development of a Joint Reaction Force in 2003, German reforms have proposed 
only successive alterations to the ‘settings’ of the policy instrument, due to the retention of conscription and 
the extent to which Germany lags behind Britain and France in its investment in high-technology weapons 
systems. Lungu, “Military Modernization and Political Choice: Germany and the US-Promoted Military 
Technological Revolution During the 1990s,” 261-72. 
40 The 2002 ‘New Chapter’ and 2004 Defence White Paper spelt out more clearly the implications of ‘third 
order change’ in terms of capabilities and military structures and also paved the way for new doctrinal 
development. 
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continuity in respect to institutional forums, in the form of the persistence of the ‘bridge 
role’ and ‘bi-furcated’ Federal Executive. 
At face value, Britain, France and Germany display strong divergence in relation to 
the institutional forums of defense policy. Britain, remains firmly committed to the 
trans-Atlantic relationship through NATO, despite the incremental Europeanization of 
its defense policy following the October 1998 St. Malo Accord; French defense policy 
prioritizes ESDP, although it is increasingly Atlanticised, symbolized by its immanent 
return to NATO’s integrated military command structures; whilst Germany continues to 
promote a ‘bridge role’ between ESDP and NATO.  
The longer-term development of the EU as an increasingly militarized regional and 
global actor, notably since the launch of EDSP at the Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999, would appear to indicate the development of a rival security 
organization to NATO with overlapping competencies. The EU is gradually developing 
the structures and capabilities (following the December 1999 Helsinki Headline 
Goals41, HHG 2010, Battlegroup Initiative42, creation of the European Capabilities 
Action Plan (ECAP) in December 2001 and the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) in June 2003), to permit the conduct of more robust missions at the 
higher end of the conflict spectrum. This appears to present a growing competitor to 
NATO’s Response Force (NRF)43, that was initiated at the November 2002 Prague 
Summit. At the same time, NATO is at the inception of developing its peace-support 
capabilities as outlined by the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)44, endorsed at 
the Riga Summit, November 2006.   
European armed forces are therefore subject to a ‘three-way capability stretch’.45 
Within the context of shrinking defense budgets, Britain France and Germany face 
commitments deriving from their own national defense requirements and the Headline 
Goal 2010/EDA procurement initiatives requiring the development of capabilities 
which will ensure an autonomous capacity for European military action. They also face 
the challenge of meeting the NATO’s 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment and 
initiatives developed under the Allied Command for Transformation, designed to 
enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and facilitate NRF deployments. 
                                                
41 The HHG established a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) consisting of 60,000 troops deployable at 60 days 
notice, sustainable for up to one year in the field, capable of fulfilling not only the low-end Petersburg 
Tasks, but also of sustaining one medium- to high-intensity operation. 
42 The Battlegroup Initiative approved at the May 2004 European Council created up to 15 Battlegroups, 
each consisting of 1,500 troops, deployable within 15 days, enhancing the EU’s capacity to launch 
simultaneous low-high-intensity rapid response operations, attaining full operational capability in 2007. 
43 A high-readiness, technically advanced, joint air, naval and infantry force of 21,000 troops (of which 
only 300 are American) able to remain in the field for up to 3 months, deployable within 5 and 30 days, 
attaining operational readiness in October 2004. 
44  CPG builds upon the 1999 Strategic Concept by identifying the core threats to NATO as international 
terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, failed or failing states, regional crises, misuse 
of technologies and disruption of resource flows. CPG outlined the necessity of being capable of 
conducting operations which require the comprehensive coordination of ‘several authorities, institutions 
and nations’ in the context of operations that may involve the simultaneous conduct of combat, 
stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian missions (termed the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’). CPG, 29 November, 2006, pt. 16, h-i. 
45 Sperling, “Capabilities Traps and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” 
457. 
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However, such a pessimistic picture of disjuncture between the EU and NATO is 
unfounded. Instead, it is perhaps more accurate to point to an increasing degree of 
complementarity and co-operation in terms of military capacity, command facilities and 
force planning46 and a growing strategic coherence between NATO and the EU. This 
complementarity is evidenced by the March 17 2003 Berlin-Plus Agreement. Berlin 
Plus provides the EU with access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and assets 
for EU crisis management operations and places the NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (DSACEUR) in command of the EU operation (under the 
authority and guidance of the EU’s PSC).   
Berlin Plus also put in place arrangements for mutually reinforcing capability 
requirements.47 The establishment of the EU-NATO Capability Group in May 2003 has 
sought to foster complementarity in procurement initiatives between the two 
organizations. This is a process that has been facilitated by attempting to ensure that the 
same country takes the lead role in developing the matching capabilities within each of 
the institutions (for example Germany’s role as the lead nation in the development of 
strategic airlift capabilities within NATO and ESDP). The work of the EU-NATO 
Capability Group is supplemented by regular meetings between EU and NATO 
officials.48 Moreover, on 3 October 2005 a permanent NATO liaison within the EU 
Military Staff and a permanent EU planning cell at SHAPE were established.49 
Despite the EU’s gradual shift towards the capacity to undertake higher-intensity 
tasks, the NRF – heavier, designed for major theater operations and linked to U.S. 
policy – remains strongly differentiated from the RRF, that is lighter and focused on 
low-medium intensity crisis-management mechanisms and less rapidly deployable.50 
This is reflected in the nature of ESDP missions which have largely been at the lower 
end of the conflict spectrum (rule of law, policing/police advisory missions, security 
sector reform and border assistance missions), operational experience that is reinforcing 
                                                
46 Thomas S. Mowle and David H. Sacko “Global NATO: Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 3 (winter, 2007); Sten Rynning, NATO Renewed: The Power and 
Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 155; 172; Stale Ulriksen 
“Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures,” International Peacekeeping 
11, no.3 (2004): 468. Whilst the EDA’s ‘Initial Long-Term Vision for European Capability and Capacity 
Needs’ notes the necessity for a ‘more characteristically European approach’ to NEC ‘different in ambition 
and character (for example with a strong emphasis on civil-military interoperability, and on the tactical 
level)’ it notes that efforts must ‘ensure interoperability with the leading efforts of the U.S. in this area’ and 
‘nested within NATO conceptual frameworks and standards’. Initial Long-Term Vision for European 
Capability and Capacity Needs (Brussels: European Defence Agency, October 2006), 20-21. 
47 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the EU: A Progress Report,” 
International Affairs 81, 4 (autumn 2005): 814-8; Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the 
European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 170; Rynning, NATO Renewed: The Power and 
Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation, 175; Richard Whitman, “NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging 
Division of Labour?” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no.3 (2004):  430.  
48 These include at a minimum of two meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers; three meetings at 
Ambassadorial level per semester; two meetings at the level of Military Committee per semester and 
regular and routine meetings at the committee and staff level. 
49 Cornish and Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the EU: A Progress Report,” 812. 
50 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 14-15; Rynning, NATO Renewed: The 
Power and Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation, 157.  
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the EU’s expertise and credibility in civilian crisis-management and prevention.51 Of 
the 20 missions so far conducted under ESDP, only four Operations (EU-FOR Althea, 
EU-FOR Tchad/RCA, EU-FOR Concordia and EU-FOR RD Congo) have involved the 
deployment of peace-support forces capable of conflict at the higher-intensity of the 
conflict spectrum. In contrast, three of NATO’s five current military operations (ISAF, 
KFOR and Operation Active Endeavour) involve the deployment of troops prepared for 
conflict at higher end of the conflict spectrum.52  Given the additional difficulties 
associated with the brokering of agreement on NATO’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’, 
ESDP is likely to remain the institutional forum of choice for the conduct of lower 
intensity crisis-management/prevention operations. 
Additionally, NATO and the EU are emerging as organizations with more distinct 
regional responsibilities. The 12 December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) 
heralds the EU’s responsibility to contribute to global security by tackling the key 
threats of terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and 
organized crime.53 However, although the strategic radius of EU operations has 
expanded significantly since 199954, ESDP missions are predominantly focused on the 
geo-strategic neighborhood of the EU: the Western Balkans, Middle East, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Caucuses. Whilst CPG outlines a set of similar challenges for NATO,55 the 
military deployments of the Atlantic Alliance have taken on a global character since 
September 11th, as illustrated by its most prominent contemporary operation, ISAF in 
Central Asia. Hence although both the NRF and RRF initiatives draw specifically upon 
the troops of the British Joint Response Force, French EMF and German ‘rapid reaction 
force’, the relationship between ESDP and NATO cannot be thought of in zero-sum 
terms. ESDP is not indicative of a fissure in the Atlantic Alliance and the gradual 
emergence of a European rival to NATO.56 Posen succinctly captures this combination 
of partly overlapping and partly complementary competencies of the two institutional 
forums: ‘European members of NATO have not abandoned that Alliance; instead they 
                                                
51 The civilian dimension of ESDP, launched at the June 2000 European Council, has been bolstered by the 
Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and 2010. 
52 NATO support for the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (AMIS) involves the provision of air 
transport for peacekeepers and training for AU officers; the NATO Training Assistance Implementation 
Mission in Iraq is focused on training Iraqi Security Forces.  
53 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, pp.1-5. 
54 Whilst the EU’s ‘strategic radius’ does not yet match that of NATO, it has expanded significantly since 
the end of the Cold War. Jones (2007: 216) calculates this ‘strategic radius’ as extending 4,000km from 
Brussels. Headline Goal 2010 agreed a distance of 6,000km from Brussels as a planning basis for military 
operations (German Defence White Paper, 2006, p. 38. 
55 ‘The principle threats to the Alliance are international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems, as well as instability caused by failed or failing states; regional 
crises; misuse of new technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.’ The Riga Summit: A 
Reader’s Guide, 6th July, 2007, p.4. 
56 David H. Dunn, “European Security and Defence Policy in the American Security Policy Debate: 
Counterbalancing America or Rebalancing NATO?” Defence Studies 1, no.1 (spring, 2001): 153; Howorth, 
Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 44-45; Ulriksen, “Requirements for Future European 
Military Strategies and Force Structures,” 469-71. See also UK Defence White Paper 2004, pt. 2.19: ‘The 
UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, rather than 
competing with it.’ The 2006 German Defence White Paper, p. 40 states: ‘The EU and NATO are not in 
competition with one another, but make complementary contributions to our security.’ 
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have supported the construction of a parallel structure and indeed regularly support 
improved cooperation between NATO and ESDP’.57 
 
Table 1: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French 
and German Military Reform 
        
            Objectives              Instruments                 Institutional Fora             Temporality 
 
Britain 
 
 
From Cold War role 
of territorial and 
alliance defense to 
global low-high 
intensity expeditionary 
crisis-management 
operations, as part of 
multi-national 
coalitions. 
 
Professional Force (from 
1962). 
Reduction from Cold War 
Force of 306,000 (1990) 
to 226,000 troops.  
Creation of ‘Joint 
Reaction Force’ and more 
flexible planning and 
command capabilities in 
1996/97. Capability 
procurement increasingly 
focused on requirements 
of asymmetric and net- 
centric warfare.   
Continuity in 
prioritization of 
NATO; though 
incremental shift 
towards embedding 
within ESDP 
following Anglo-
French October 1998 
Saint Malo Accord. 
Temporal Location: May 
1997-July 1998, 
incremental shift towards 
embedding within ESDP in 
October 1998. 
 
Pace: 14 months. 
 
Sequencing: Objectives, 
Instruments, 
Institutional Forums. 
France From Cold War role 
of territorial defense to 
global low-high 
intensity expeditionary 
crisis-management 
operations, as part of 
multi-national 
coalitions. 
 
Conscript Force  
(1905-1996); 
Professional Force (from 
1996).  Reduction from 
Cold War force of 
400,000 to 250,000 troops 
in 1996.  
Creation of ‘Joint 
Reaction Force’ and more 
flexible planning and 
command capabilities in 
1996. Emphasis upon 
development of 
autonomous technology 
for ESDP (Galileo, FFI) 
From ‘semi-detached’ 
defense policy during 
Cold War, between 
NATO and national 
strategic autonomy to 
post-Cold War 
prioritization of 
ESDP, and 
increasingly active 
role in strengthening 
NATO. 
Temporal Location: 
February 1994 - October 
1996. 
 
Pace: 32 months. 
 
Sequencing: Institutional 
Forums, Objectives, 
Instruments. 
Germany From Cold War role 
of territorial and 
alliance defense to 
global low-high 
intensity expeditionary 
crisis-management 
operations, as part of 
multi-national 
coalitions. 
Conscript Force (from 
1956). Reduction from 
370,000 troops with 
170,000 conscripts (set by 
the 1990 Two Plus Four 
Treaty), to 252,500 troops 
with 50,000 conscripts by 
2003. 
‘Creation of Joint 
Reaction Force’ and more 
flexible planning and 
command capabilities in 
2003. Lower investment 
in high-technology 
weapons systems. 
Continuity in ‘bridge 
role’ between ESDP/ 
NATO and in 
‘bifurcated’ Federal 
Executive in form of 
‘Europeanized’ 
Foreign Ministry and 
‘Atlanticized’ Defense 
Ministry. 
Temporal Location: May 
2003 - October 2003 
(reform of objectives). 
 
Pace: 6 months (reform of 
objectives). 
 
Sequencing: Objectives 
(changes only to the 
‘settings’ of instruments and 
continuity in institutional 
forums). 
 
                                                
57 Posen, “The European Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity,” 184. 
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Competing Theoretical Frameworks: Realist and Cultural Approaches 
 
Realism and Military Reform 
 
Neo-realist accounts of military reform suggest that the anarchic logic of the 
international system drives change at the domestic level, leading to the adoption of new 
military methods.58 The changing systemic distribution of capabilities and new security 
challenges, coupled with the necessity of survival in a ‘self-help’ world leads to two 
possible outcomes. Firstly, emulation, the adoption of ‘best practice’ in order to enhance 
competitive effectiveness: ‘Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived 
by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity…competition produces a tendency 
towards sameness of the competitors…and so weapons of major contenders and even 
their strategies begin to look much the same’.59 Secondly, innovation, the discovery of 
new knowledge, invention of new practices or their recombination in new forms.60 
Neo-realism posits that executive decision-makers enjoy a high-level of autonomy 
in translating threats from the international security environment into change to military 
doctrine and structure and in overcoming domestic opposition and bureaucratic politics, 
due to the intensity of external threat.61 Convergence of the objectives and instruments 
amongst states of broadly similar relative material power and geographical location (and 
therefore a similar level of external vulnerability) is an inevitable consequence of the 
seismic shifts in the distribution of international power brought about by the end of the 
Cold War.62 Neo-realism points to two main factors, common to Britain, France and 
Germany that have determined a pattern of ‘clustered convergence’ in Europe 
characterized by only a partial emulation of the U.S.-led model of high-intensity force 
projection and RMA: the complexity of the post-Cold War security environment and 
resource constraints which increase the risks consequent upon emulation, creating an 
incentive to bandwagon of U.S. power.63  
Firstly, in the relative absence of great power war and the diverse nature of 
conflict and threats in the post-Cold War international system, it has been difficult for 
European states to define ‘best practice’. On the one hand, the US-led 1991 Gulf War, 
1999 Kosovo Conflict, 2001 attack on Afghanistan and 2003 attack on Iraq, highlighted 
the utility of technological prowess in the context of expeditionary high-intensity war-
fighting, demonstrating the success of the RMA.64 Yet, at the same time, the Iraq conflict 
                                                
58 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the Wars; Resende-
Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army. 
59 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127. 
60 Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 72. 
61 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the Wars, 77; Rynning, 
“Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decision Makers Between International Power and Domestic 
Interests,” 85. 
62 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, 243; Posen, “The European Security and Defence 
Policy: Response to Unipolarity,” 149-86. 
63 On ‘clustered convergence’ see Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army 2007: 
78. 
64 Boot, “The New American Way of War,” 41-58; Lungu, “Military Modernization and Political Choice: 
Germany and the US-Promoted Military Technological Revolution During the 1990s,” 265; Andrew L. 
Stigler, “A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo,” International Security, 
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post-2003, the NATO ISAF mission and U.S./European involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia and Africa during the 1990s, have demonstrated the dangers inherent in a 
reliance on air power, stand-off precision-strike weapons systems and command, control 
and communications systems, in the context of peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction 
and policing tasks and counter-insurgency operations. 65 Secondly, the nature of Britain, 
France and Germany as ‘second-rank’ powers, constraining their resource-technological 
capacity to copy the RMA, magnifying the risks associated with emulation.66 Hence, 
emulation of the RMA and U.S. ‘best practice’ is most evident in areas of least risk and 
cost - the reorganization of military structures in the form of the creation of Joint 
Reaction Forces and the development of technologies essential to ensure continued 
interoperability with the U.S., as well as an autonomous European capacity for military 
action.67 
Neo-realist thought suggests two main readings of the development of ESDP and 
patterns of overlap/complementarity in institutional forums. The first view is that Europe 
is engaging in a form of ‘soft’ balancing against the U.S., using non-military tools to 
frustrate unilateral action, forming the first stage of attempts by European states to 
contain a potential opponent.68 The other suggests that ESDP is not a potential rival to 
NATO and the U.S., but instead forms the development of ‘reformed bandwagoning’ 
within the alliance following the failure of Europe’s pursuit of a ‘binding’69 strategy 
                                                                                                                                            
27, no.3 (winter 2002/03): 124-57. It is however important to note that, the utility of air power in force-on-
force combat is contested. In spite of the success of the U.S. in targeting Serbian infrastructure and 
economy, the contested authority of U.S. air power was demonstrated by the Kosovo conflict of 1999, that 
illustrated how: ‘a well-operated if obsolescent integrated air defense system can defend a ground force 
skilled at camouflage and deception,’; Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of 
U.S. Primacy,” 28. See also Galia Press-Barnathan “The Myth of Airpower in the Persian Gulf and the 
Future of Warfare,” International Security 26, no.2 (summer 2001): 5-44; Stephen Walt, “Taming 
American Power,” Foreign Affairs 84, no.5 (autumn 2005): 116; R. Williams, “Is the West’s Reliance on 
Technology a Panacea for Future Conflict or Its Achilles Heel?” Defence Studies 1, no.2 (2001): 48.  
65 “Brains, Not Bullets,” The Economist, October 25 2007. David Betz, “Redesigning Land Forces for Wars 
Amongst the People,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no.2 (summer 2007): 221-243; Stephen Biddle, 
“Allies, Airpower and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,” International 
Security 30, no. 3 (winter 2005/06): 161-76; Daniel L. Byman, “Building the New Iraq: The Role of 
Intervening Forces,” Survival 45, no.2 (summer 2003): 57-71; Carter Malkasian, “Did the United States 
Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al-Anbar,” Defence Studies 8, no.1 (spring 2008): 78-104; 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs 81, no.3 (summer 2002); Thomas E. 
Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
66 Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army, 73. 
67 Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 46; Holger Mey, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: A 
German Perspective,” Comparative Strategy 17, no.3 (summer 1998): 316; Sperling, “Capabilities Traps 
and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship?” 456-59. 
68 On ‘soft balancing’ see Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International 
Security 30, no.1 (summer 2005): 7-45; Thazha Varkey Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” 
International Security 30, no.1 (summer 2005): 46-71; Barry R. Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World 
Power,” International Spectator 34, no.1 (spring 2004): 5-17; Posen, “The European Security and Defence 
Policy: Response to Unipolarity,” 149-86 and Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global 
Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005), 129.  
69 ‘Binding’ refers to the ability of smaller alliance partners to use institutional ties to restrain a larger 
alliance partner from pursuing unilateral policies and avoid ‘entrapment’ by a more powerful ally. See 
Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 70-72. 
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through NATO.70 The fear of ‘entrapment’ into U.S. policy, or ‘abandonment’71 through 
the withdrawal of the US security guarantee has incentivized policy leadership in Britain, 
France and Germany on behalf of the pooling of military resources with European Allies. 
This has taken place through the ‘Europeanization’ of NATO and development of the 
NRF (granting increased influence in Washington and a global high-intensity capability 
in major theater war) and through the simultaneous development of an increasingly 
militarized ESDP (small, self-contained Battlegroups permitting autonomous action by 
the EU within its geopolitical neighborhood, in cases of US disinterest).72  
ESDP forms an attempt by European states to maintain and manage the Atlantic 
Alliance within the context of complex post-Cold War security threats and strategic 
interests which have a largely unifying, but sometimes differentiated impact on Europe 
and the U.S.. Whilst bandwagoning runs the risk that the U.S. may pose a threat to its 
great power allies once it has eliminated other opponents, bandwagoning emerges as the 
most rational strategy open to European states.73 It is the strategy of least risk and cost; a 
means with which to attempt to gain some, albeit limited, influence over U.S. policy and 
‘share in the spoils of victory’ against common opponents.74 This convergence in 
institutional forums is consistent with the convergence of capabilities: ‘Europe’s attention 
is directed towards enhancing European autonomy on security affairs while redressing 
the acknowledged capabilities shortfalls to meet the needs of the [Atlantic] alliance’.75  
Yet despite longer-term convergence trends in objectives, instruments and 
institutional forums, Britain, French and German reforms display significant 
differentiation in temporality. It is here that neo-realism’s explanatory capacity is found 
wanting, for it fails to fully account for the role of domestic power relationships in 
determining the pace, sequencing and temporal location of military reform due to the 
emphasis it places upon the preoccupation of civilian leaders with the ‘national interest’ 
rather than domestic political interests. Neoclassical realism provides a mechanism with 
which to account for the intervening role played by unit-level variables. The theory 
                                                
70 On reformed bandwagoning see Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity,” 
271-309; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing: International 
Security, 30, no.1 (2005): 80; 91-92; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why 
the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no.1 (2005): 109-39.  
71 Press-Barnathan, “Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity,” 307-08. 
72 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation 2007: 219; King, “Towards A Transnational Europe: 
The Case of the Armed Forces,” 331; Posen, “The European Security and Defence Policy: Response to 
Unipolarity,” 180; Rynning, NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation, 151; 
157. 
73 Hyde-Price, European Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity, 50. 
74 “[States] may not feel immediately threatened by the power which provides them the spoils or feel that 
the potential threat is more distant. In the context of an existing conflict, therefore, watching a friend gain 
power may not be completely comforting, but the short-term priorities of security demand that you gain 
now against your enemy and worry about the postwar balance of power with your friend later”. Eric J. 
Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no.4 
(winter 1997): 15-16. As Lieber and Alexander highlight: ‘The U.S. is plausibly threatening to only a 
limited number of states and terrorist groups. Most other major powers share the U.S. interest in countering 
these regimes and groups…other major powers lack an underlying motivation to compete strategically with 
the United States.” Robert J. Art et al, “Striking the Balance,” International Security 30, no.3 (winter 
2005/06): 192. 
75 Sperling, “Capabilities Traps and Gaps: Symptom or Cause of a Troubled Trans-Atlantic Relationship?” 
458. 
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argues that whilst over the long-run states will seek to maximize their international 
influence according to their relative material power resources, ‘state power’ - the impact 
of the strength of a country’s state apparatus and its relations to the surrounding society 
upon ability of the state to mobilize and extract resources from society - forms the central 
intervening unit-level variable explaining short-medium term temporal divergence.76  
In his neoclassical realist account of French military reform, Rynning argues that 
although the international distribution of capabilities – relative material power – is the 
key driver of convergence, ‘strategic leadership’ by statesmen emerges as the crucial 
determinant of ‘state power’.77 Rynning identifies three facets of strategic leadership: 
strategic innovation – the role of statesmen in linking strategic agendas to doctrinal and 
structural change; institutional protection – the ability of political leaders to anchor new 
ideas within political institutions, manage institutional venues and disadvantage 
alternative ideas or proponents of the status quo; finally, ‘allied cooperation’ – the 
framing of reform with common ‘strategic readings’ of a state’s international partners.78 
Convergence and divergence can therefore be explained by a focus upon the strength of 
the international power shift and the extent to which policy leaders are able to 
successfully manage these three aspects of policy change: ‘Shifts in national power 
provoke policy change…only after central decision-makers have structured the reform 
process and articulated a new doctrinal blueprint capable of winning significant domestic 
support’.79  
However, it is important to note that the implications of shifts in national power 
are not always immediately clear, impacting upon the temporality of military reform over 
the short-term. Following significant systemic power shifts, a short term temporal lag 
with systemic imperatives is likely as states become more familiar with the radical 
changes in their strategic environment. This creates particular informational uncertainty 
and flux, requiring the readjustment and fine-tuning of strategy to the new configuration 
of constraints and opportunities. The temporal lag also reflects the potential costs of 
‘system punishment’ that can stem from strategic miscalculation, hence states will tend to 
err on the side of caution and only make decisions based upon information that is as 
complete as possible, within the inherent constraint of systemic uncertainty.  
In addition, whilst Rynning emphasizes the intervening role played by policy 
leadership in managing doctrinal change80, neoclassical realism also draws our attention 
to the central role played by domestic power relationships – the level of ‘executive 
autonomy’ in defense and security policy – in determining temporal divergence.81 As 
Rose states: ‘Power analysis must also examine the strength and structure of states 
                                                
76 On ‘state power’ see Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 152 and Taliaferro, 
“State Building For Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State,” 479-80.  
77 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 90. 
78 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 90-92. 
79 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 104-16. 
80 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 114. 
81 Taliaferro, “State Building For Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource Extractive State,” 
487-90. 
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relative to their societies, because these affect the proportion of national resources that 
can be allocated to foreign policy’.82 In short, although policy leadership is an important 
variable, it is not a sufficient account of temporal divergence. The institutional structure 
of the state (the degree of centralization), the formal constitutional powers of the core 
executive (Presidents/Prime Ministers/Defense Ministers) over defense policy and nested 
and interlinked policy subsystems (defense/budgetary/social policy) form the framework 
for ‘balancing domestic power’.83  Domestic power structures act to condition the ability 
and willingness of policy leaders to provide ‘strategic leadership’ on behalf of 
convergence with systemic power shifts.  
The temporal location, sequencing and pace of British, French and German 
reform is dependent upon the strength of the international power shift, coupled with the 
autonomy afforded to the political executive in defense policy by domestic material 
power relationships. This determines whether policy leaders, over the short-medium 
term, will undertake ‘strategic innovation’ or promote ‘strategic stasis’ and whether 
‘institutional protection’ will be given to new ideas or to Cold War policies on the 
objectives and instruments of defense policy. Executive autonomy is also the key 
intervening variable in explaining the extent to which policy leaders will be preoccupied 
with the domestic political ramifications of the ‘framing’ of military reform within 
NATO/EU ‘allied cooperation’ or with the ‘national interest’ and systemic imperatives. 
Within a context of low executive autonomy, ‘culture’ emerges as a resource employed 
by policy leaders in the ‘balancing of domestic power’ and the temporal management of 
reform.  
 
Culture and Military Reform 
 
The cultural turn in strategic studies argues that realist approaches cannot provide 
a full explanation of the scope and temporality of military reform because they treat the 
preferences of actors as given; national preferences and international reality are instead 
socially constructed.84 Norms emerge as a cause of action and constitutive, expressing 
actor identities, shaping how actors define their interests and providing standards of 
appropriate behavior.85 Culturalists regard military policy as driven by ideas rather than 
material factors, representing a ‘culturally bounded, institutionally-embedded pattern 
persisting over time’ and a national security culture that: ‘predispose(s) societies in 
general and political elites…toward certain actions and policies’.86 As Fischer states: ‘It 
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is not that institutions cause political action; rather it is their discursive practices that 
shape the behavior of actors who do’.87  
Hence the objectives of British, French and German defense policy are not 
conditioned by the imperative of self-help in an anarchic international system, but are 
instead subjective and consequent upon their distinct ‘cultures of national security’.88 The 
persistence of territorial defense as the core objective of German defense policy until 
2003 stems from the ‘culture of anti-militarism’ that is deeply rooted in the German 
political-military elite and society. This continues to predispose Germany to focus on 
low-medium intensity crisis-management operations.89 Similarly, the more active post-
Cold War roles of Britain and France lie in the long-established traditions of low-high 
intensity expeditionary power projection that characterized their defense policies during 
the colonial era.90  
Longhurst and Irondelle emphasize the role of ‘path dependency’ in social 
causation.91 This mirrors the insights of historical institutionalism that argues that 
institutions push historical development along particular paths, hence the effects of 
systemic forces are mediated by inheritance from the past.92 Institutions embody tool-kits 
of action that provide actors with ways of defining problems and ‘logics of appropriate 
behavior’ in a given situation – determining the persistence of conscription in France 
until 1997 and in Germany until the present day. As Irondelle states: ‘On the question of 
conscription vs. professional armed forces the [French] army found itself faced with a 
question not just of practicability, but of identity’.93 
In her work on British and French military doctrine Kier argues that in order to 
understand changes in military policy we must not only play close attention to the 
‘organizational culture’ of the military, but also to the changing domestic political 
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context and civil-military relations.94 For Kier, culture forms an intervening variable: 
‘Domestic politics set constraints; the military’s culture interprets these constraints; the 
organizational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and military 
doctrine’.95   
 
Explaining Policy Change: Critical Junctures, Policy Learning and Normative 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Culturalist accounts have drawn criticism for their inability to explain change, as they 
posit that policy displays a high level of inertia due to deeply-embedded nature of ‘core’ 
or ‘central’ beliefs.96 Change is gradual, with radical change only possible in the context 
of ‘external perturbations’ or ‘critical junctures’ – seismic and formative historical events 
that illustrate the failure of existing objectives and instruments of defense policy and 
empower new actors and policy ideas within institutions.97     
Public policy theories elaborate on the structure/agency dynamic at the heart of 
policy change – notably the ‘advocacy coalition framework (ACF)’ and ‘multiple streams 
framework’.98 Irondelle posits a synthesis of these two approaches in explaining the 
professionalization of the French armed forces in the context of ‘path dependency’.99 
Whilst exogenous shock is critical, the policy entrepreneur is decisive in spurring ‘critical 
conjuctures’ - coupling the three streams of the policy process – problems, policies and 
politics.100  
However, the presence of competing advocacy coalitions is also important.101 The 
ACF conceptualizes policy as the result of competition between coalitions structured by 
policy beliefs and values. Change is not only the result of competition amongst interests, 
but also learning, within and between coalitions. Initiating or hindering policy-learning 
processes are vital tools in the hands of policy entrepreneurs in controlling the scope and 
direction of policy change.102 Hence in France a ‘professional armed forces advocacy 
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coalition’ provided the ‘innovative options’ on which the Chirac was able to act as a 
policy entrepreneur.103 
Longhurst and Dalgaard-Nielsen also emphasize the dynamic nature of strategic 
culture.104 Such accounts argue that policy change reflects the role played by policy 
leaders and ‘political-military elite voices within the national strategic community’105 as 
‘political/norm entrepreneurs’106 or ‘strategic culture agents’.107 In accordance with 
Anthony Gidden’s ‘Theory of Structuration’, change is dependent upon the ability of 
actors within the political executive and broader defense and security policy subsystem to 
‘create culture’, altering ‘peripheral’ and ‘operational’ beliefs through the control of 
legitimate discourses on defense and security policy and in using such discursive tools to 
‘rise above the culture they are socialized into and actively attempt to manipulate it’.108 
This normative entrepreneurship by the ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘agenda-setters’ of a strategic 
culture re-defines actors’ perceptions of their interests by refashioning the institutional 
rules and cognitive paradigms that persist within society and the institutions involved in 
defense policy agenda-setting and implementation.109  
The concept of strategic culture overlaps with the work of the Copenhagen School 
(CS) on ‘securitization’. Whilst the CS starts with the realist understanding of security as 
an exceptional realm, changes to the objectives of defense policy emerge from normative 
processes. The extent to which an issue is identified as a security threat depends upon the 
role of ‘securitizing actors’110 in defining an issue that is already ‘politicized’111 as a 
threat to one or more ‘referent objects’.112 Hence the re-definition of security threats takes 
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place through an act of ‘securitization’,113 drawing an issue into the realm of 
exceptionality. At the heart of this process lies the ‘speech act’ – the use of discourse to 
convincingly articulate a new issue in security terms as an existential threat to ‘referent 
objects’ to the public and the defense and security policy subsystem.  
However, the CS has been criticized for its ‘internalist’, Derridian position - the 
assumption that speech acts have productive power and the ability to cause, change and 
found new structures of significance in social relations.114 Stritzel argues in favor of an 
‘externalist’ position - that closer attention must be paid to the ‘social sphere’ within 
which the ‘speech act’ takes place.115 The success of a ‘speech act’ will be determined by 
three forces – the performative power of the articulated threat; its embeddedness within 
existing discourses and the positional power of the actors who influence the process of 
defining meaning.116 As Stritzel states: ‘It is their embeddedness in social relations of 
meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts’, moving the 
securitization literature towards a focus on the extent to which actors are able to work 
within the pre-existing cultural context, to determine how international issues are 
perceived.117 Despite its more recent emphasis upon the role of agency and discourse in 
reshaping belief systems, strategic culture offers a strongly ‘externalist’ account of 
‘securitization’. It suggests that the social context within which ‘securitizing actors’ 
operate is more restrictive than Buzan et al posit, offering less scope for the identification 
of new issues as security threats, playing a decisive role in shaping the objectives of 
defense policy, the appropriate policy instruments and military capabilities.  
In her focus on organizational culture, Kier argues that in order to understand 
changes to military doctrine, closer attention must be paid to civil-military relations – 
change is dependent upon the level of civilian consensus on the domestic role of the 
armed forces: ‘the greater the civilian consensus about the position of the military in the 
state, the more likely it is that international threats and opportunities will shape their 
decisions’.118  
Normative approaches lead us to believe that divergence in national preferences 
on institutional forums should be understood as the product of norms rooted in ‘founding 
moments’ – formative experiences or ‘critical junctures’ – and in long-term socialization 
processes consequent upon participation in international institutions.119 Culturalists who 
emphasize longer-term convergence in British, French and German preferences on 
institutional forums argue that this is not only a product of systemic incentives, but also 
reflects ‘norm convergence’ and the internalization of common values.120 Normative 
convergence is a product of policy-learning processes consequent upon interaction 
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through joint military operations and ‘elite socialization’ within EU and NATO 
institutional forums, leading to the gradual convergence of domestic norms concerning 
the objectives and instruments of defense policy and the development of a ‘European 
strategic culture’.121 The contradictory nature of the relationship between the EU and 
NATO – both complementary and overlapping - lies in the piecemeal, evolutionary and 
gradual nature of norm convergence.122 As Meyer argues: ‘Normative convergence in 
these areas does not mean that national beliefs have become fully compatible…only that 
differences have narrowed’.123 
Hence the cultural turn in strategic studies, whilst subject to internal contestation, 
argues that temporal location, sequencing and pace of military reform is determined by 
norms which are institutionally and societally-embedded and emphasizes the impact of 
historical experience and collective memory in determining policy choices.124 These 
norms constitute the identities of actors and form ‘tool kits of action’, mediating systemic 
pressure and displaying a high-degree of inertia.125 In cases of ‘misfit’ between the 
changing international security environment and domestic norms, convergence is either 
rapid and ‘fundamental’ (in the case of a critical juncture), or incremental, taking the 
form of fine-tuning.126 However, change to the ‘cultural core’ is not simply the product of 
structural factors or ‘historical pressures’127 but depends upon the role of political leaders 
in the core executive and actors within the broader defense and security policy subsystem 
as political entrepreneurs/securitizing actors on behalf of cognitive change128 or upon 
‘civilian’ consensus concerning the domestic role of the armed forces.129  
However, the following section will demonstrate that military policy and the 
temporality of reform processes cannot be fully explained through cultural approaches.  
A normative analysis is unable to provide a convincing explanation of the divergent 
temporal location of ‘third-order’ military reform in the UK (1997-98) and France (1994-
96). The strong civilian consensus on the domestic role of the armed forces in the UK and 
institutionally and societally-embedded norms concerning the military’s (low-high 
intensity) global role in crisis-management and prevention would lead one to expect 
reform at an earlier, or at least similar, ‘temporal location’ than France, where ‘third-
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order’ change was delayed by a ‘path dependent’ commitment to conscription.130 It is 
also difficult to explain the slow pace of British reforms (14 months), given such an 
‘enabling’ normative context. This is all the more perplexing when compared to the pace 
of the 2003 reform to policy objectives in Germany (6 months). Cultural accounts imply 
that the German ‘culture of anti-militarism’ should have ensured a more incremental pace 
of reform than in the UK due to societal and institutional resistance to radical reform to 
policy objectives and changes to the ‘settings’ of the policy instrument.  
Instead we must look to the causal role played by material power relationships at 
the international level and the intervening role of domestic power relationships – to 
international structure and executive autonomy. 
 
Testing Neoclassical Realist and Cultural Approaches to Convergence and 
Divergence 
 
Germany: Domestic Constraint and the Temporal Management of Reform 
 
Over the 1990s German policy makers have promoted an increasingly active role for the 
Bundeswehr. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defense Minister Volker Rühe (1992-98) used 
the 1991 Gulf War and 1994 Srebrenica Massacre to legitimate widening the remit of 
German military action from its Cold War role of territorial and alliance defense to force 
projection. This culminated in the 12 July 1994 Constitutional Court Ruling, permitting 
German troops to operate outside NATO’s geographical boundaries. Yet the CDU/CSU 
1994 ‘Conceptual Guidelines for the Further Development of the Bundeswehr’, 
developed by Rühe, proposed minimal restructuring, downsizing the military from 
370,000 including 170,000 conscripts (the upper ceiling of troops numbers set by the 
Two Plus Four Treaty of 1990) to 340,000 with 140,000 conscripts and retained 
territorial defense as the core task of the Bundeswehr.  
The ‘Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal’ reform of SPD Defense Minister 
Rudolf Scharping (1998-2002) of June 2000 also outlined only first-order change to the 
‘settings’ of policy, reducing the military to 277,000, including 77,000 conscripts. This 
was surprising, particularly given the suggestions of an independent Commission, known 
as the ‘Weizsäcker Commission’, set up by the SPD/Green Government to review the 
tasks and structure of the Bundeswehr. The Commission’s Report (May 2000) codified 
the lessons of the Kosovo conflict, recommending radical structural and doctrinal reform: 
crisis-management as the Bundeswehr’s core objective and a force of 240,000 with 
30,000 conscripts, in order to ensure that Germany would be able to effectively 
contribute rapid reaction forces to the December 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) 
and the pooling of European military capabilities.131 
Only in 2003 did SPD Defense Minister Peter Struck (2002-05) abandon 
territorial defense in favor of expeditionary crisis-management and prevention as part of 
the ‘worldwide fight against international terrorism’, Germany would now be ‘defended 
on the Hindukush’.132 The reform removed the distinction between a low-readiness Main 
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Defense Force (MDF) of 279,000 troops for territorial defense and a Crisis Reaction 
Force (CRF) of 53,600 troops for peacekeeping – created in 1992 by Defense Minister 
Gerhard Stoltenberg (1989-1992) and retained by Rühe and Scharping.133 In its place, 
Struck developed a 35,000-strong ‘rapid reaction force’, designed for higher-intensity 
expeditionary warfare operations; 70,000 stabilizing troops for low- to medium-intensity 
post-conflict reconstruction/peacekeeping missions and 147,500 support/logistical 
forces.134 Commanded by a single Chief of Staff and a Joint Command Headquarters), 
the ‘rapid reaction force’, combined with Struck’s strengthening of the Special 
Operations Division (KSK), (first established under Rühe in 1996) as the ‘spearhead 
force of the new Bundeswehr,’ represents an important first step towards convergence 
with the British Joint Reaction Force and French EMF model.135 The creation of  a Joint 
Operations Command (Einsatzrat) is an important step towards the centralization of 
Bundeswehr command structures, a trend that started with the development of the 
German Army Operational Command in 1994 and  has accelerated over the post-Cold 
War era, mirroring developments in the UK and France.136 The shift to full-spectrum 
tasks in the support of crisis-management and prevention, the fight against international 
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD was reinforced by the 2006 Defense White 
Paper.137  
However, despite these developments, Germany is not a case of ‘third-order’ 
change. The retention of 50,000 conscripts is not only a practical impediment to the 
development of an expeditionary capacity, but also a financial burden, when funds are 
required for investment in high-technology capabilities to permit force projection, 
limiting Germany’s ability to contribute to medium-high intensity operations and the 
extent to which it is possible to undertake even partial convergence around the US-led 
RMA.138 These deficits in investment have been compounded by the comparatively late 
temporal location of Germany’s shift from territorial defense to ‘crisis-management’ (that 
has led to investment in inappropriate capabilities) and tight restrictions on defense 
spending.139  
Cultural accounts of policy change dominate the literature on German military 
reform. Longhurst emphasizes the role of ‘path dependency’ and strategic culture in 
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explaining German commitment to Cold War policy instruments (notably conscription), 
determining the sequencing of German reform (reform to the policy objectives followed 
by only partial reform to the policy instrument).140 Maull and Berger point to ‘the 
German ‘culture of anti-militarism’ in informing the objectives of defense policy and 
temporal location of the shift towards expeditionary crisis-management.141  This has 
formed a powerful normative structural constraint on the willingness and ability of 
political figures to enact policy change, disincentivizing the ‘securitization’ of new issues 
and the development of new defense policy objectives.142 Entrepreneurial action by 
political leaders on behalf of a ‘crisis consciousness’ or ‘norm entrepreneurship’ on 
behalf of a more ‘interventionist’ role for the armed forces, force projection and a 
professional military, is associated with great political risk.143  
However, a focus on neoclassical realism and executive autonomy provides a 
more convincing account of the process and outcome of reform. The nature of Germany 
as a federal ‘negotiation’ democracy increases the sensitivity of the core executive to the 
politics of base closures.144 Combined with the close linkages between financial, 
budgetary and social policy in the form of the large number of conscientious objectors 
providing cheap labor to an overstretched social system, this creates a powerful constraint 
on the ability and willingness of figures within the core executive to undertake ‘strategic 
leadership’, promote new policy ideas (crisis-management/prevention and a professional 
Bundeswehr) and respond to the changing international security environment.145 This 
suggests that executive autonomy, rather than the normative constraints of strategic 
culture and ‘social sphere’ in which a ‘speech act’ is embedded, forms the key 
determinant of the success of a securitizing act, by incentivizing policy leaders to 
champion ‘securitization’ processes in the first place.146  
These interlinked policy subsystems led to an interest by the powerful German 
Finance Ministry under Theo Waigel (1989-98) and Hans Eichel (1999-2005), in the 
promotion of policy stasis on the instruments of defense policy (conscription) due to the 
negative repercussions of ‘third-order’ change for German adherence to EMU’s Stability 
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and Growth Pact and budget consolidation.147 ‘Executive autonomy’ is further 
compromised by the diffusion of competencies on defense policy within the core 
executive. Whilst the Chancellor plays a central role in formulating general defense 
policy guidelines (the Kanzlerprinzip), the Defense Minister emerges as crucial in the 
implementation of policy and in controlling the scope and temporality of policy change 
(the Ressortprinzip).148 
The German case draws our attention to a key weakness of the literature on 
strategic culture: that culture is not a stand-alone variable, but instead can be a tool in the 
hands of political leaders in the core executive who are preoccupied with domestic 
politics – the ramifications of reform for the electoral success of their political party and 
personal political ambitions.149 This implies the instrumental use of culture by political 
elites in the domestic political and temporal management of reform, opening cultural 
approaches to attack from neoclassical realism for ‘conflating mind and matter’.150 
Crucially, it points to the central role of ‘executive autonomy’ and domestic material 
power relationships in explaining the temporality of patterns of convergence around 
systemic imperatives. 
Although Rühe exhibited an activist leadership role in responding to the 
imperatives of the international security environment and expanding the objectives of 
defense policy in the initial post-Cold War period, he hesitated in translating this into 
reforms to the objectives and instruments of defense policy once his domestic strategic 
room for maneuver narrowed. Kohl and Rühe identified electoral dangers in structural 
reforms to the Bundeswehr in 1993-94 when the prospects for the government in the 
forthcoming federal elections looked bleak.151  
Faced with a slow-down in the German economy and the threat of unrest within 
the CDU/CSU and electorate at the prospect of widespread base closures, Rühe instituted 
a ‘Denkverbot’ (ban on thinking) within the Defense Ministry on issues of doctrinal or 
structural change, providing ‘institutional protection’ to territorial defense and 
conscription.152 He appointed conservative officials within the Ministry to act as 
‘gatekeepers’ to the flow of policy ideas, blocking policy-learning processes about the 
inadequacies of a conscript force and territorial defense. These processes were beginning 
to take root within the ministry in the context of the changing security environment and 
Bundeswehr missions in the Adriatic (1992-96), Cambodia (1992-93), Somalia (1993-94) 
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and Bosnia (1993-95).153 The narrowing of ‘executive autonomy’ in defense policy 
incentivized Rühe’s promotion of ‘stasis’ rather than ‘strategic innovation’ in his 1994 
reform.154 
Under Scharping the political and temporal management of reform also took the 
form of actively mediating systemic imperatives for ‘third-order’ change to the 
objectives, instruments and institutions of German defense policy, particularly those 
presented by the 1999 Kosovo War. The implications of the conflict were codified by the 
Weizsäcker Commission, whose conclusions were marginalized by Scharping, despite 
the consensus that the policy forum had generated amongst its participants about the need 
for a military orientated to crisis-management/prevention, a dramatic reduction of 
conscription and the development of an autonomous European military capability.155 
Scharping was successful in ensuring policy stasis and impeding policy learning, and 
exerted a strong measure of control over the context of ideas within which reform took 
place. He did so by blocking change agents within the policy subsystem and at the macro-
political level to ensure that they did not challenge his veto-role.156  
The promotion of policy stasis became increasingly difficult to reconcile with 
Germany’s expanding international role during Struck’s tenure as defense minister due to 
the increasing disjuncture between German policy and systemic imperatives. German 
participation in NATO’s ISAF force and the development of NATO’s RRF was 
accompanied by complex and skilful leadership role from Struck in the 2003 reform. 
Struck combined ‘strategic innovation’ to the objectives of German defense policy with 
only partial change to the instruments of defense policy, preventing forces for change 
from shaping policy.157 Strategic culture formed a resource, used selectively by Struck to 
control the policy process, justifying change to the Bundeswehr’s tasks (as crucial to 
renewing Germany’s long-standing commitment to its UN, NATO and EU partners) and 
impeding change to the structure of the Bundeswehr (by emphasizing the importance of 
conscription for civil-military relations, the principle of ‘innere Führung’, (inner 
leadership) and emphasizing the utility of conscripts in undertaking low-medium 
intensity peacekeeping operations).158 However, as Edmunds and Longhurst demonstrate, 
professional and specialist forces are an imperative for both peacekeeping and higher-
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intensity expeditionary operations.159 Hence in the context of the ISAF mission and post-
Cold War crisis-management operations undertaken by the Bundeswehr, opposition to 
conscription within the Defense Ministry began to mount, with several Generals calling 
for ‘highly-trained fighters’ and expressing their bitterness about the role of Zivildienst in 
producing policy stalemate.160  
As Rynning argues, policy leadership emerges as an important unit-level variable 
in shaping the temporal location, sequencing and pace of military reform.161 Although 
Chancellors set the strategic guidelines for policy change, and their support was 
necessary for the development and implementation of reform, control over the scope and 
pace of policy change was consequent upon the ‘day-to-day’ management of the policy 
sector and ministerial policy leadership (the Ressortprinzip).162  Policy change to the 
doctrine, and particularly structure, of the armed forces depended much on the ability of 
Rühe, Scharping, and Struck to open-up or block processes of policy learning and 
political debate, within the policy subsystem and at the macropolitical level, to negotiate 
constitutional constraints on the role of the Bundeswehr and obtain parliamentary 
approval for the Bundeswehr’s deployment.163 This involved close attention to the use of 
strategic culture as a resource with which to justify their chosen leadership roles and 
frame policy proposals.164   
However, the decisive causal factor in determining German divergence in 
temporality lies not in the execution of policy leadership, but in the deficits in executive 
autonomy on defense policy to which the Chancellors and Defense Ministers were 
subject. ‘Executive autonomy’ explains why the 1994 and 2000 reforms only outlined 
changes to the ‘settings’ of policy and the delayed temporal location of reform to the 
objectives of German defense policy (2003). Executive autonomy also determined the 
sequencing (reforms only to the settings of the policy instrument) and pace of reform (6 
months). Struck was keen to engineer a fait accomplis and close down the possibility for 
a macro-political debate on reform to the policy instrument in the face of increasing 
domestic opposition to conscription within the SPD/Green coalition and the development 
                                                
159 Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Post-Cold War 
Europe,” 1069; Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 124. 
160 “Ende mit Schrecken,” Spiegel, 17 March 2003, A50. 
161 Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers Between International Power and 
Domestic Interests,” 85-116. 
162 Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over 
International Opportunity,” 372-3; Dyson, Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy 
Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era, 188-92. 
163 Both Rühe and Scharping were also keen to avoid alienating powerful regional figures within their 
parties due to their personal political ambition of the Chancellorship. This further circumscribed their 
willingness to push through radical base closures and contributed to the careful spatial targeting of base 
closures and avoidance of large-scale closures in Länder with forthcoming elections. (Dyson, 2007: 104; 
108; 173). The sensitivity of the politics of base closures and the abolition of conscription made the 
Defense Ministry something of a political graveyard and an unattractive ministerial position, gaining a 
reputation as a ‘Schleudersitz’ (ejector seat) (Dyson, 2007: 229). 
On Rühe and constitutional constraints see Dyson, 2007: 59-61; on Rühe, the Bundestag and the 
deployment of troops see Dyson, 2007: 61; on Struck and negotiating constitutional constraints see Dyson 
2005: 376-77. 
164 Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-2004: The Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over International 
Opportunity,” 361-86; Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and 
Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era, 80-81; 189-92. 
 29 
of a ‘mature’ advocacy coalition championing an end to conscription.165 The pace of 
reform to the objectives of policy and its specific temporal location (at the beginning of 
the 2002-06 legislative period) also reflected the SPD’s concern to implement the base 
closures consequent upon a 35,000 troop reduction well in advance of the next Federal 
elections.166 
The institutional forums of German defense policy continue to cohere around the 
traditional German ‘bridge’ role, between British/U.S. and French preferences.167 Indeed, 
it is possible to identify a ‘bi-furcation’168 within the Federal Executive, between a 
highly-Europeanist and active Foreign Ministry in ‘uploading’ German preferences to 
ESDP and an ‘Atlanticized’ Defense Ministry, more reactive and resistant to the 
anchoring of defense policy within ESDP.169 
Cultural approaches posit that the German ‘bridge role’ and ‘bi-furcated Federal 
Executive’, split between a ‘Europeanized’ Foreign Ministry and ‘Atlanticized’ Defense 
Ministry, is a consequence of the post-war experience of rehabilitation into the 
international community and concomitant necessity to negotiate and broker French and 
U.S. concerns through the EU and NATO respectively.170 It also reflects the need to 
broker agreement between the two dominant advocacy coalitions in Germany defense 
policy – one Europeanist, centered on the SPD/Greens, the other Atlanticist, embedded 
within the CDU/CSU and FDP.171  
However, neoclassical realism provides a more convincing explanation of German 
preferences on institutional forums than neo-realism or cultural accounts. Whilst ‘allied 
cooperation’ over the long-run reflects systemic imperatives, unit-level factors in the 
shape of domestic material power relationships form important intervening variables. 
This explains the active role of the German Foreign Ministry in developing ESDP and the 
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Defense Ministry’s reactive ‘laggard’ role in dealing with the implications of ESDP for 
the objectives and instruments of German defense policy.172  
Defense Ministers were critical in determining the extent and manner in which 
German defense policy was Atlanticized and Europeanized. The greater ‘institutional 
credibility’ of NATO within the Defense Ministry is more than just a product of ‘elite 
socialization’ and ‘institutionally-embedded norms’; it stems from the unwillingness of 
Rühe, Scharping and Struck to appoint or promote pro-Europeanist Vordenker 
(innovators) within the Defense Ministry for fear of domestic political implications.173 
This was an attempt by Defense Ministers to avoid the potentially de-stabilizing effects 
that framing reform within ‘allied cooperation’ as part of ESDP could have upon the 
political and temporal management of reform due to the pressure it would create within 
the Defense Ministry to abolish conscription. This would have implied damaging 
repercussions for the social and financial policy subsystems and politically-sensitive base 
closures in the context of a federal system.174 In short, the Defense Ministry has been 
locked into domestic institutional structures that gave little incentive to ‘Europeanize’ the 
Bundeswehr and instead promoted the active leadership of Defense Ministers in shaping 
and using ‘Atlanticization’ and ‘Europeanization’ in the interests of their own domestic 
political agendas.175 
Conversely, German Foreign Ministers have benefited from a greater level of 
autonomy in promoting ‘allied cooperation’ through the EU. This is a consequence, not 
only of the long-term role of the Foreign Ministry as the senior coordinating Ministry 
pursuing European integration, but also of Foreign Ministers’ status as leaders of smaller 
coalition partners (until the SPD’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2005), reducing their 
sensitivity to the electoral fall-out of base closures and financial implications of the 
abolition of conscription. A focus on domestic power relationships helps to explain why 
both Klaus Kinkel (Liberal Party Foreign Minister 1992-1998) and Joschka Fischer 
(Green Foreign Minister 1998-2005), concerned with the limitations of territorial defense 
objectives and a conscript-based policy instrument, sought out (ultimately unsuccessful) 
roles as ‘strategic innovators’ on behalf of a professional  military, orientated towards 
crisis-intervention tasks.176 
Whilst the domestic political implications of the embedding of policy within 
EU/NATO represent a significant intervening variable impacting on policy choices of 
institutional venue in the short-medium term, Germany, in line with the UK and France, 
has become increasingly willing to put its weight behind the development an independent 
                                                
172 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the 
post-Cold War Era, 173-74; Wolfgang Wagner, “From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European 
Security and Defence Policy,” German Politics 14, no.4 (winter 2005): 455-69. 
173 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the 
post-Cold War Era, 173-74. 
174 Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-2004: The Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over International 
Opportunity,” 365-69. 
175 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the 
post-Cold War Era, 175-77. 
176 Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the 
post-Cold War Era, 68-71; 95. 
 31 
capacity for Europe to act autonomously.177 This strategic imperative became particularly 
pressing for Germany in the context of the 2002 US Security Strategy and in the run-up 
to the 2003 Iraq crisis.178 The intensified fear of ‘entrapment’ or ‘abandonment’ by the 
US has led to changes to the objectives of German defense policy in an attempt by 
Germany to gain greater influence within the U.S. and ensure a measure of European 
autonomy of action by contributing to the pooling of European military resources, routed 
through both NATO and ESDP.179 Hence in the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines, Struck 
framed the changing objectives of German defense policy as a means with which to 
contribute to the development of an ESDP as the ‘European Pillar’ of the Atlantic 
Alliance, thereby strengthening the Bundeswehr’s capacity to provide troops for both the 
NRF and RRF, reinforced by the Grand Coalition’s Defense White Paper of 2006.180 
  
France: Domestic Incentives and Strategic Innovation 
 
Until 1994 the objectives of French defense policy were characterized by stasis 
and the perpetuation of the principles of national strategic autonomy and territorial 
defense. However, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur instigated a ‘revolutionary’ reform 
of defense objectives in the 1994 Defense White Paper.181 In the context of complex new 
security threats, the White Paper outlined a ‘paradigm shift’ from strategic autonomy, to 
cooperation as part of NATO and, in particular, through the emerging ESDP, 
emphasizing the necessity to develop a military capable of ‘preventing and managing 
crises of variable intensity’.182  
However, it was not until the election of President Jacques Chirac in May 1995 
that third-order change was initiated. The reform of 1995-96 built upon the changes to the 
objectives of defense policy and institutional forums initiated by Balladur. Not only 
would the role of the armed forces be to impose French or international will through 
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‘coercive force’, but also through the ‘mastery of violence’. The new military doctrine 
was designed to ensure that the armed forces could be used as a tool with which to 
prevent and control the escalation of conflict, employing a ‘totality of political, 
diplomatic, humanitarian and media actions’, representing close convergence with the 
UK’s concept of ‘defense diplomacy’.183   
The experience of French participation in the 1991 Gulf War and of peacekeeping 
during the Wars of Secession in the former Yugoslavia forcefully demonstrated the 
inadequacies of a reliance on the deterrent power of the Force de Frappe and a conscript 
army in tackling contemporary global and regional security challenges (Menon 1995; 
Bloch, 2000).184 Hence Chirac proposed radical structural reform, abolishing conscription 
and streamlining the military from 400,000 to 250,000 (excluding gendarmerie) between 
1996 and 2002, increasing the number of forces available for global deployment in 
support of full-spectrum tasks from 12,000 to 60,0000. The military was re-structured 
according to the principle of ‘modularity’, allowing flexibility in the face of changing 
security exigencies (Bloch, 2000: 38; Laird and Mey, 1999: 51). This has facilitated the 
development of specialized units (Joint Reaction Forces) that can be drawn together as a 
force of between 50-60,000 at short-notice by four Etat Major des Forces (EMF) 
Headquarters, replacing the division-level commands of the Cold War.185  
In France, normative accounts emphasize the critical roles played by Edouard 
Balladur in redefining the objectives of defense policy in the 1994 Defense White Paper 
and by President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Alain Juppe in ‘manufacturing 
culture’, by using the Gulf War and French participation in Bosnia to generate a 
perception of crisis concerning appropriate policy instruments, notably the ‘citizen in 
uniform’.186 McKenna (1998) and Irondelle (2003b) argue that Chirac and Juppe, 
spearheaded an ‘advocacy coalition’ in favor of a professional military. This initiated 
policy-learning to institutionally-embedded beliefs on conscription, leading to a new 
civilian consensus around the domestic role of the armed forces and upon the need for the 
creation of a professional armed force.187 ‘Third-order’ change could then be 
implemented despite the preferences of the military for a ‘mixed force’ of conscripts and 
professionals, an analysis that also appears to confirm the arguments of Kier (Bloch, 
2000).188 For Irondelle path dependency forms the decisive variable explaining the pace 
of reform and the 32 months that elapsed between reform to the objectives and 
institutional forums of policy and the creation of a professional armed force.189 This 
account has much in common with the ‘externalist’ securitization account of Stritzel, who 
argues that closer attention to the social context of the ‘speech act’ is necessary - in this 
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case the social context was highly-restrictive, slowing down policy change.190 However, 
neoclassical realism and a focus on ‘executive autonomy’ provides a more convincing 
explanation of patterns of convergence and divergence in the temporality of reform.  
The French President enjoys a high-level of autonomy in defense policy, 
incentivizing strategic innovation on behalf of convergence with systemic imperatives.191 
This autonomy is a product of the unitary state, nature of military policy as the ‘reserved 
domain’ of the President, the low salience of regional and local elections compared to 
Germany, prolonged window of opportunity open to French Presidents to enact policy 
change due to the seven year term of office (until 2002) and weak linkages between the 
social and defense policy subsystems. McKenna states: ‘his [the French President] 
extraordinary powers with regard to national defense weaken the argument that he is 
obliged to consult with any persons concerned with defense matters’. As will become 
clear, deficits in this autonomy during cohabitation (1993-95) are a central factor in 
explaining the pace of ‘third-order’ reform.192 
The empirical evidence undermines culturalist arguments that posit the 
importance of civilian unity over the domestic role of the armed forces in determining 
convergence with systemic imperatives.193 Neither can change be explained by analyzing 
the role of Chirac as a ‘securitizing actor’ or ‘norm entrepreneur’, spearheading an 
‘advocacy coalition’ affecting ‘peripheral, operational and central beliefs’ of national 
strategic culture and building civilian consensus around change to the policy 
instrument.194  
In 1995 there was little consensus amongst the public concerning an all-volunteer 
force and only a ‘nascent’ advocacy coalition promoting the end of conscription.195 
Whilst the political center-right (UDF and RPR) was broadly in favor of professional 
forces, the French Left opposed the abolition of conscription.196 This ‘civilian disunity’ 
was reflected in Assembly complaints that President Chirac had failed to consult MPs 
and the general public and in public opinion, which was strongly opposed to  the 
abolition of conscription in 1995.197 Indeed, even the Defense Minister, Charles Millon, 
was opposed to a fully-professionalized force.198 The all-volunteer force was also a 
surprise for the military which, in the context of Balladur’s 1994 White Paper, had drawn 
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up its own model of structural reform under the guidance of General Jean-Rene Bachelet 
(‘The Army of the 21st Century’) outlining a ‘mixed model’ of conscripts and 
professionals.  
The empirical evidence attests not to path dependency as the determinant of the 
pace of reform (32 months) but points instead to the intervening roles played by domestic 
power relationships during cohabitation from 1993-95. Under cohabitation Mitterrand 
lacked several key domestic material power resources in defense policy. Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur (RPR) claimed defense policy to be a ‘shared domain’ necessitating a 
greater level of compromise in the policy sector.199 The forthcoming Presidential 
elections also provided little incentive for Socialist candidates to act as a ‘strategic 
innovators’ and open-up debate about conscription, due to the uncertain electoral benefits 
of campaigning on behalf of professional armed forces, helping to explain why Chirac 
‘carefully avoided talking about all-volunteer forces’ and ‘at no time suggested 
abandoning conscription’ during the 1995 election campaign.200 
It was only upon the election of Chirac as President in May 1995 that the 
domestic window of opportunity opened for strategic leadership on reforms to the policy 
instrument.201 The experience of joint operations with the British in the Gulf and Bosnia 
left Chirac convinced that the British military should be the ‘model against which the 
French would measure themselves’ and that professionalization would be the only means 
with which to operate effectively in the context of the multinational low-high intensity 
peacekeeping operations, which increasingly characterized French military 
deployments.202 Whilst Chirac’s base closures elicited protest, particularly in North-East 
France, his seven-year term of office and the end of cohabitation allowed him to promote 
third-order policy change by pointing to the challenges and opportunities presented by the 
international security environment, the imperative of meeting the Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria and long-term savings associated with professional armed forces.203 
Indeed, military reform presented an excellent opportunity for Chirac gain early political 
credit and profile himself as an innovator.204  
Chirac’s autonomy was further enhanced by the nature of linkages between the 
social, finance and defense policy subsystems. In Germany the implications of third order 
reform for social policy encouraged the Finance Ministry under both the Kohl and 
Schröder governments to militate against convergence with systemic imperatives in order 
to meet the Maastricht Convergence Criteria. Conversely, the French Finance Ministry 
enhanced Chirac’s autonomy in defense policy: ‘The reform of the armed forces in 1995-
96 directly originated in budget cuts…the fundamental issue of the single currency 
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enabled the Treasury to have unprecedented power under the 5th Republic over defense 
policy’.205   
Whilst the Finance Ministry supported Chirac’s reform agenda, during 
cohabitation (1993-95) the same institution, led by Edmond Alphandery of the opposition 
UDF, had employed its ‘unprecedented power’ to militate against change, acting as a 
powerful veto-player. As Irondelle demonstrates: ‘The Finance Ministry and its powerful 
Budget Committee favored the continuation of conscription for financial reasons’.206 In 
addition, the constraints of cohabitation also increased the sensitivity of Mitterrand to 
opposition to professionalization from the Interior Ministry, led by Charles Pasqua of the 
Gaullist RPR Party, that benefited from recruits serving in the police force and civil 
security.207 Hence in 1995 Chirac enjoyed not only a clearer picture of systemic 
imperatives than Mitterrand, but also much greater ‘executive autonomy’ and incentives 
for action than the former President had experienced.  The protracted sequencing of 
reform was a reflection of the domestic material power relationships under cohabitation 
which circumscribed an entrepreneurial leadership role on the abolition of conscription 
from 1993-95.    
Accordingly, the process of ‘third-order’ reform reflected the ‘material’ power 
resources at Chirac’s disposal in French defense policy and ‘entrepreneurial policy 
leadership’. This stands in marked contrast to Germany, where Defense Ministers emerge 
as key figures in the management of reform processes: ‘Chirac used all the resources of 
his policy leadership to ensure the change to a professional army against the wishes of 
both the armed forces and the Defense Ministry’.208 The Presidential proposals for reform 
were drawn up within a select working group, the Commaunité Stratégique that granted 
privileged influence to close political confidants of Chirac, such as former Minister of 
Defense Pierre Messmer.209 The Commaunité Stratégique formed the first stage of 
‘institutional protection’, allowing the President to engineer a fait accomplis and 
marginalize any potential opposition within the broader political system, particularly the 
Left.  
Chirac was able to overcome resistance to strategic innovation within the Defense 
Ministry by providing further ‘institutional protection’ to ‘third-order’ change through the 
Defense Ministry’s Strategic Affairs Division (SAD) that had been strengthened under 
Balladur and Pierre Joxe (Defense Minister 1991-1993). Joxe had recognized the 
necessity for an empowered Chief of Staff and a horizontal organization of the military, 
rather than vertical, separate services,  allowing greater military-political cooperation in 
the context of out-of-area and low-medium-intensity operations.210 The SAD was also 
closely aligned with the Foreign Ministry, a strong supporter of a professional force, 
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acting as a ‘broker’ of change within the Defense Ministry.211 Hence Chirac was able to 
compel the Chiefs of Staff and Military to professionalize the military.212 
The President’s decisive ‘strategic innovation’ and the ‘institutional protection’ 
afforded by the SAD allowed him to delegate the technical details of force structure to 
the military.213 This laissez-faire approach to force structure contrasts markedly to 
Germany, where the federal system and powerful regional politicians incentivize acute 
concern with the detail of force structures and spatial targeting of troop reductions, in 
order to minimize the political impact of base closures.214 ‘Executive autonomy’ ensured 
that Chirac could leave the detail of reform to the military, confident in appropriate 
change to the policy instrument and in his ability to implement the reform model.215 It is 
also important to note that Chirac’s strategic innovation was seized upon by military 
planners as an opportunity to renew France’s strategic importance.216 These factors 
combined to inform the military’s development of an enhanced force projection 
capability and embrace new doctrine (the ‘mastery of violence’), in addition to the more 
traditional ‘coercion by the means of force’, as its two key operational modes. 
According to cultural explanations of policy change, the post-Cold War shift from 
‘national sanctuary’ to the ‘Europeanization’ of French defense policy is a product of 
‘socialization processes’ to which the French elite were subject at the European level.217 
Such accounts also draw attention to the central roles of President Jacques Chirac and 
Prime Minister Alain Juppe as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in developing a sense of crisis 
consciousness and promoting policy-learning concerning the failure of ‘splendid 
isolation’ and, in its place, championing an advocacy coalition that promoted a 
Europeanized military policy. This resulted in ’paradigm change’ to the cognitive and 
normative elements of French defense policy making.218 Culturalists posit that the 
sequencing and temporal location of French changes to the institutional forums of 
defense policy (1994), that preceded reform to the objectives of policy, reflect the 
identification and resonance of ESDP with deeply-embedded  Gaullist norms concerning 
the role of France as a ‘Third Force’ in international politics and the ‘Europeanization’ of 
French exceptionalism. This has been a hallmark of Chirac’s discourse on ESDP.219 As 
Chirac stated of the ESS: [The ESS Represents] A Europe which…places at the heart of 
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everything it does respect for a number of principles…which constitute both a French 
Republican Codes of Ethics…and a shared code of ethics of Europe’.220 
However, in order to understand why French changes to institutional forums took 
place at such a comparatively early temporal location (1994), a focus on specific features 
of French ‘external vulnerability’ is critical. The ‘Europeanization’ agenda outlined by 
Balladur was not only a response to uni-polarity, and a mechanism with which to allow 
France and Europe to take independent military action in the context of U.S. disinterest, 
in addition to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance and exerting greater influence within 
the U.S. by strengthening NATO.221 It was also a means with which to ensure French 
influence within its regional milieu.  
By early 1994 the doctrine of ‘national sanctuary’ left France increasingly isolated 
in a critical policy area in European integration that could provide a forum for France to 
stake out a pace-setting role. This reflects long-standing French concerns about relative 
power within the European Union and attempts to exert leadership and influence in 
European Defense Cooperation.222 As German power and influence within the EU 
increased during the 1990s, though its agenda-setting in creating a ‘monetary Europe’ 
(EMU), so the French under Balladur and Chirac sought to revive efforts (that can be 
traced back to the 1963 Elysee Treaty on Franco-German cooperation) to balance 
German increasing influence within the EU through monetary policy by carving out a 
lead role in shaping ‘Defense Europe’.223 This also helps explain the nature of post-Cold 
War patterns of high-technology capability investment in France - in support of an 
autonomous French and European military capability and the routing of its response to 
the US-led RMA through ESDP and the ‘Europeanization’ of the French defense 
industrial sector during the 1990s.224  
Hence although the ‘Europeanization’ agenda and the Saint Malo Initiative 
allowed Chirac to bind the French left-wing to ‘third-order’ reform ‘executive autonomy’ 
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ensured policy leaders could focus, not on the domestic political ramifications of ‘allied 
cooperation’ (a more pronounced feature of policy leadership by German Defense 
Ministers), but on the ‘national interest’ and convergence with regional and systemic 
imperatives.225  
The French case highlights once more that neither ‘culture’ nor ‘international 
structure’ can fully explain policy convergence and divergence. Whilst the changing 
distribution of capabilities forms the decisive causal variable, domestic power 
relationships – ‘executive autonomy’ – is the central intervening unit-level variable 
determining the overall temporal location of French reform (1994-96).  
 
The UK: Constraint and Incentives – ‘Brokerage to Facilitate Innovation’ 
 
Britain’s initial responses to the post-Cold War security environment, the 1990 
‘Options for Change’ and 1993 ‘Statement on Defense Estimates’, were piecemeal and 
evolutionary outlining only ‘first order’ changes to the ‘settings’ of the objectives and 
instruments of policy.226  It was not until the 1997 Labour Government that ‘third-order’ 
reform was initiated in the 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR). In contrast to the 
military’s Cold War role (territorial and alliance defense and continental European 
strategy of high-intensity conflict with Soviet troops on the German plain), the Review 
outlined a wide scope of defense missions: peace-support and humanitarian operations 
and the prevention and diffusion of crises within and outside NATO’s geographical 
scope.227 The SDR called not only for shifts in emphasis in existing defense missions, but 
also created a new role for the British military, ‘defense diplomacy’.228 As Thornton 
states: ‘The changes introduced, were so fundamental as to question the role of the 
British Army: did it exist to protect the power of the state, or did British soldiers now 
have the primary role of humanitarian diplomats in uniform?’.229  
In the light of these changing objectives the SDR also proposed significant 
structural reform. The Conservatives had downsized the armed forces from 306,000 to 
226,000; hence the Review did not involve large-scale reductions.230 Instead it 
reorganized the military to permit one full-scale, or two small-scale deployments. 
Crucially, the SDR institutionalized the Joint Rapid Deployment Force set up by the 
Conservatives in 1996, creating the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, structured around Navy, 
Air and Infantry assets, permitting the swift expeditionary deployment of low-high 
intensity British military power, providing a focal point for capability investment, 
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accompanied by the creation of several other joint organizations.231 The army was 
restructured from six regiments into six mobile brigades, divided into two war-fighting 
divisions, increasing flexibility, mobility and sustainability on operation. The review also 
initiated investment in high-technology capabilities in order to permit network-enabled 
warfare, augmenting battlespace awareness and control capabilities and using Stealth 
technology, developed in conjunction with the U.S., to facilitate power projection.232 
 The 1999 Kosovo War demonstrated deficits in strategic lift capabilities, 
precision bombing and tactical communications, whilst operations in Afghanistan and 
Sierra Leone also highlighted the requirement for lighter forces and an explicit focus on 
the threats posed by ‘failed states’, international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. 
Accordingly the 2002 ‘New Chapter’ (a ‘mini-review’ of the armed forces) and 2004 
Defense White Paper, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ outlined additional 
changes to ‘settings’ of the policy instrument, to provide expeditionary forces capable of 
sustaining three small- and medium-scale European-led operations or one large-scale 
operation, conducted with the U.S..  
Cultural approaches posit that what at first appears ‘radical’, ‘third-order’ change 
to the objectives and instruments of British armed forces resonated with deeply-
embedded norms within the British military.233 Convergence with systemic imperatives 
did not challenge the Defense Ministry’s embedded ‘logic of appropriateness’ and UK 
‘national security culture’, as the military’s Cold War function had been grafted onto an 
understanding of the role of the military that allowed smooth adaptation to the SDR’s 
Baseline. The military’s historical task in building and maintaining empire developed a 
conception of the role of the army as fighting small wars outside Europe, the perception 
of ‘war as jape’ and a ‘distaste for inactivity’ – the military had therefore retained its 
‘colonial focus’ throughout the 1970s and 80s.234  
These embedded norms help explain why although reforms to force structures 
were dependent upon internal MoD expertise, they reflected the objectives set out in the 
SDR’s baseline.235 This view is also supported by Miskimmon, who emphasizes not only 
the role of institutionally-embedded norms, but also those rooted in British society: ‘The 
UK’s colonial past, coupled with its institutional-embedding in the international 
community, has created a sense of responsibility and global outlook, in the minds of the 
British public and political elite regarding the UK’s international responsibilities for 
peacekeeping and crisis-management’.236 Hence new security challenges and policy 
instruments were not objective, but were instead identified by their resonance with 
inheritance from the past: ‘the army had old wine that flowed well into the new 
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bottles’.237 Such accounts overlaps with the arguments of ‘externalist’ securitization 
theorists, who argue that successful speech acts must resonate with this underlying social 
context, for the speech act is ‘historically intertextual and translates past meaning 
structures into the present’.238 However, closer attention to domestic material power 
relationships provides a stronger account of the process and outcome of reform.  
The unitary state and centralization of power in the British core executive leads to 
a comparatively low salience of local elections, providing a sustained ‘window of 
opportunity’ between parliamentary elections to implement reform, minimizing the 
political impact of base closures consequent upon military restructuring. In addition, the 
links between social and defense policy subsystems are relatively weak in the UK, as the 
abolition of conscription in 1962 ensured there was no system of ‘community service’ 
providing cheap labor for the British social system.  
However, although these material power relationships grant the core executive a 
high level of autonomy in the implementation of reform, the formal powers of the core 
executive in defense policy are not as distinct as in France, where power is concentrated 
in the hands of the President. The lack of a written constitution makes it more difficult to 
identify the ‘formal’ competencies of the core executive in defense policy. At the same 
time post-war UK defense policy has largely been characterized by bipartisan consensus, 
apart from the Labour Party’s position on nuclear weapons during the 1980s.239 
The evolutionary approach that characterized military reform during early-mid 
90s under the Major administration was a reflection of the particularly ‘murky’ flux and 
uncertainty that characterized the initial international post-Cold War security 
environment: ‘a defense review could be rapidly overtaken by events’.240 Although post-
Cold War strategic imperatives became increasingly clear in the mid-90s following the 
1991 Gulf War and conflict in the former Yugoslavia, this coincided with a reduction of 
‘executive autonomy’ for the Conservatives in the context of internal party disunity over 
Europe that ruled out innovation on institutional venues and impending parliamentary 
elections in which defense was not a key issue.  
The 1997 Labour Government, buoyed by a large parliamentary majority, was 
well-placed to engage in strategic innovation and saw in the SDR an opportunity to stake 
out an image as forward-thinking party in area in which it traditionally lacked an image 
of competence.241 However, Defense Secretary George Robertson played the role of 
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‘policy broker’. In contrast to Chirac’s marginalization of opposition through the 
Commaunité Stratégique, strategic innovation in Britain was consensual, with several 
summer seminars and appointment of an expert group to summarize the conclusions.242 
This ‘brokerage’ role in strategic innovation was a result of two factors. Firstly, 
following Labour’s defection from the tradition of bipartisan consensus on the issue of 
nuclear weapons in the 1980s (identified as an electoral mistake by New Labour 
Politicians) Prime Minister Tony Blair and Defense Minister George Robertson were 
keen to ‘bind-in’ the Conservative opposition and create an image of competence.243 
Secondly, Labour wished to open up the decision-making process to input from the 
Foreign Office, in order to ensure that the SDR’s ‘baseline’ would reflect Labour’s 
‘internationalist’ Foreign Policy. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Robin Cook chaired the 
three summer seminars with Robertson. This reflected ‘brokerage to facilitate 
entrepreneurship’.244 
Unlike France, where ‘executive autonomy’ permitted a top-down leadership style 
by President Chirac, but necessitated ‘institutional protection’ in the form of the French 
Defense Ministry’s SAD, such ‘institutional protection’ was not provided in the UK, 
using existing structures and in-house staff, instead of establishing a separate review 
team.245 Institutional protection was unnecessary as the consensual bi-partisan approach 
to ‘strategic innovation’ acted to imbue the SDR’s emphasis upon new security risks and 
strategic mobility with sufficient gravitas to leave the process of reforms to the policy 
instrument in the hands of the Defense Ministry. Additionally, there was widespread 
support within the Ministry for radical doctrinal and structural change, which was viewed 
as an opportunity to strike an appropriate balance between the combat ‘teeth’ and support 
‘tail’ of the military after Conservative reductions in logistical support.246 Hence 
‘executive autonomy’ incentivized ‘strategic leadership’ that facilitated the embrace of 
doctrinal and structural reform – the emphasis upon ‘defense diplomacy’ and the 
development of globally deployable forces, designed for low-high intensity tasks. 
The SDR was accompanied by strong strategic leadership on ‘allied cooperation’. 
Both Blair and Robertson used NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship as mechanisms 
within which to frame and embed the new role and structure of the military. Whilst 
Robertson outlined radical reform, he also emphasized Labour’s commitment to NATO 
as the key institution of British and European Security and framed military reform as a 
means with which to renew the Atlantic Alliance and ensure U.S. engagement in Europe, 
helping to bind the Conservatives to the reform agenda.247  
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Whilst British armed forces reform is a case of ‘third-order’ change – to the 
objectives and instruments of defense policy – this has not been accompanied by a shift 
of institutional forum. Despite playing an important role in the development of 
intergovernmental initiatives such as the 1998 Saint Malo Accord, 1999 Helsinki 
Headline Goals and 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and an incremental shift 
towards the embedding of British defense policy within ESDP, UK defense and security 
policy remains firmly anchored within NATO.248 Although the 2004 White Paper 
contains five references to ESDP, it only once refers to ESDP without ‘ring fencing’ this 
through reference to NATO or the U.S..249 
Nevertheless, the December 1998 Saint Malo Accord, 2002 Helsinki Headline 
Goals and 2003 ESS represent a series of important, albeit incremental, steps towards the 
embedding of British defense policy within ESDP and a recognition that Europe has to be 
capable of autonomous military action in cases of U.S. disinterest.250 Rather than the first 
signs of ‘soft’ balancing behavior by the British, ESDP represents an mechanism with 
which the UK can gain greater influence within the U.S. and strengthen the Atlantic 
Alliance by developing European military capabilities that would not only be of use to 
ESDP, but also to NATO.251  
According to normative approaches, British ‘Atlanticism’ and preference for 
routing defense cooperation through NATO represents the culturally-bounded and 
institutionally-embedded lessons drawn from the Second World War and Suez about the 
utility of the U.S. security guarantee in helping the UK ‘punch above its weight’.252 The 
sequencing and temporal location of changes to the ‘settings’ of British institutional 
forums (following changes to the objectives and instruments of policy) is a result of the 
depth of Atlanticism in British security culture, acting as a powerful constraint on the 
willingness of British policy makers to sanction any policy that might threaten the 
Atlantic Alliance.253 
However, neoclassical realism provides a more nuanced explanation of the 
temporality of changes to the institutional venues of British defence policy. The temporal 
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location of the incremental shift towards the development of a stronger European military 
capability (the Saint Malo Initiative of October 1998) is the product of the clarity of the 
implications of uni-polarity for the institutional forums of British defense policy in mid-
late 1998.254 First-order change was spurred by the fear of ‘abandonment’ by the U.S. in 
the run-up to the 1999 Kosovo conflict, which brought home to British policy makers the 
uncertainties of the U.S. security guarantee.255 A secondary, though important, factor 
determining temporality was the identification of ESDP by Blair as a means with which 
to help remedy Britain’s increasing lack of influence within the EU, countering German 
influence though EMU, compensating for the British decision not to join in the first 
wave, and for early French leadership on ESDP.256 These systemic imperatives combined 
with high levels of executive autonomy to determine the quick pace of changes to the 
‘settings’ of British policy on institutional venues.257  
Hence in contrast to Germany and in line with France, ‘executive autonomy’ has 
facilitated a stronger focus by policy leaders on the ‘national interest’, rather than the 
domestic political ramifications of ‘allied cooperation’.258 The overall pace of UK reform 
(14 months), which cultural approaches have difficulty in explaining, reflects not only the 
logistical complexity of the review process, but also the configuration of domestic power 
relationships and linkages between budgetary and defense policy, namely the Treasury’s 
wish that the SDR did not precede the Comprehensive Spending Review.259   
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Policy in the post-Cold War Era,” 194-95; Dover, ““The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: A Liberal 
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Table 2: Neoclassical Realist and Cultural Explanations of the Temporality of 
Military Reform 
 
 Britain France  Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cultural 
Explanations 
of the 
Temporality of 
Reform 
Location: 1997-98 shift to crisis-
management and restructuring 
facilitated by resonance with 
institutionally/societally 
embedded beliefs concerning role 
of military in fighting small wars 
of varying intensity outside 
Europe during the colonial era. 
Given such resonance the late 
location of convergence when 
compared to France is perplexing. 
 
Pace: 14 month reform process 
surprising given resonance of 
changes with British security 
culture. 
 
Sequencing: Reform to 
objectives, instruments followed 
by incremental Europeanization, 
consequent upon depth of 
Atlanticism within British 
security culture. 
Location: 1994-96 shift to crisis-
management/professional forces 
due to roles of Balladur and Chirac 
as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ overcoming 
path dependent commitment to 
conscription. 
 
Pace: 32 month reform consequent 
upon path dependent commitment 
to conscription. However, this fails 
to capture domestic material factors 
restricting executive autonomy. 
 
Sequencing: Reform to objectives 
and institutional forums preceding 
reform to instruments due to 
Balladur/Chirac’s role in identifying 
ESDP with idea of France as ‘third 
force’ and ‘Europeanization of 
French Exceptionalism’; impact of 
path dependent commitment to 
conscription. 
Location:  2003 shift to crisis-
management due to deeply 
embedded culture of anti-
militarism, resistant to change.   
 
Pace: Path dependent commitment 
to conscription and citizen in 
uniform’. Laggard role of Defense 
Ministry on ESDP due to post-war 
socialization processes, leading to 
Atlanticized institutional culture. 
Difficulties in explaining 6 month 
reform to objectives, given 
societally/institutionally embedded 
norms concerning objectives and 
instruments of German defense 
policy.  
 
Sequencing: Path dependency and 
impact of German security culture 
leading to stasis on policy 
instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neoclassical 
Realist 
Explanations 
of the 
Temporality of 
Reform 
 
Location: Opacity of systemic 
power shift in early 90s; 
reduction in executive autonomy 
for Conservatives in mid-90s due 
to internal disunity and 
forthcoming 1997 Parliamentary 
elections. High executive 
autonomy enjoyed by Labour 
Government in May 1997 
(unitary state, high parliamentary 
majority and weak links between 
defense, social and budgetary 
policy subsystems). 
 
Pace: Configuration of domestic 
power relationships; linkages 
between budgetary and defense 
policy –Treasury’s wish that SDR 
did not precede Comprehensive 
Spending Review. 
 
Sequencing: Incremental shift 
towards ESDP following SDR 
due to realization of threat of 
abandonment by U.S. in late 
1998. 
Location: High executive 
autonomy and ‘state power’ due to 
nature of Defense Policy as 
‘reserved domain’ of the President, 
unitary state and ability of President 
to implement base closures and 
weaker links between social, 
defense and budgetary policy 
subsystems. 
 
Pace: Nature of military policy as 
‘shared domain’ during cohabitation 
(1993-95) and lack of support from 
Finance Ministry for reform to 
policy instruments during 
cohabitation; impact of forthcoming 
Presidential elections in May 1995. 
 
Sequencing: Reform to institutional 
forums preceding objectives and 
instruments due to French focus on 
balancing German power through 
EMU by lead role on ‘defense 
Europe’; impact of cohabitation 
upon reforms to policy instruments.  
Location: Low executive autonomy 
and ‘state power’ due to dispersal of 
formal competencies on defense 
policy within core executive; 
federal state leading to heightened 
sensitivity to politics of base 
closures; interlinked social, defense 
and budgetary policy subsystems 
due to system of Zivildienst. 
‘Culture’ not causal but a tool in 
temporal and political management 
of reform.     
 
Pace: 6 month reform (May-
October 2003) due to SPD concern 
with implementing base closures 
consequent upon the downsizing of 
the armed forces by 35,000 troops 
in advance of the next Federal 
elections and to close down 
possibility for macro-political 
debate on conscription. 
 
Sequencing: Temporal 
manipulation of reform incentivized 
by low executive autonomy. 
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Conclusions 
 
Neo-realism provides only a partial explanation of convergence and divergence in 
military reform. Through its focus on role of the competitive nature of the international 
system in forcing states to organize for war as effectively as possible, neo-realism 
neglects the extent to which domestic power relationships can incentivize a short-medium 
term preoccupation with domestic political interests rather than ‘systemic imperatives’, 
leading to the domestic political and temporal management of reform. 
Although the strength of the shift in the systemic distribution of capabilities 
following the end of the Cold War is driving Britain, France and Germany towards 
convergence in the instruments, objectives and institutional forums of defense policy, the 
analysis presented also demonstrates how the policy implications of systemic power 
shifts are not always immediately clear to policy makers in the period following a 
significant shift in the systemic distribution of material capabilities. The particular 
opacity of systemic imperatives during such periods of flux forms an important initial 
intervening variable that impacts upon the temporality of reform over the short-term.260  
However, ‘state power’, impacting upon the ability of the core executive to 
‘extract and direct the resources of their societies’, emerges as the crucial intervening 
variable in explaining temporal divergence.261 The article has analyzed in particular, the 
impact of the institutional structure of the state and domestic material power relations on 
‘state power’.262 It finds that ‘executive autonomy’ in the sphere of defense policy – a 
determinant of the degree of centralization/decentralization of the state, the constitutional 
powers of the core executive and linkages between social, finance and defense policy 
subsystems – is the key intervening variable in shaping the temporality of reform. It does 
so by impacting upon the ability and willingness of Presidents/Prime Ministers and 
                                                
260 It is also important to note that whilst ‘broadly similar’ in material capabilities and ‘external 
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Defense Ministers to undertake ‘strategic innovation’ and provide ‘institutional 
protection’ to new objectives and instruments of defense policy. The extent of ‘executive 
autonomy’ in defense policy also informs the degree to which ‘allied cooperation’ 
through NATO/the EU will reflect the ‘domestic’ or ‘national’ interest over the short-
medium-term.  
Although we must look to structure (‘executive autonomy’) rather than agency as 
the root-cause unit-level variable that provides the incentive for the promotion of short-
medium term temporal lag with systemic imperatives, this does not fully negate the 
impact of specific instances of domestic reform management in determining patterns of 
change and continuity in military policy.263 A focus on the ability of policy leaders to 
successfully manage the three aspects of change – strategic innovation, institutional 
protection and allied cooperation – is certainly a significant factor in determining the 
temporality of military reform.264 This is most evident in Germany, from the mid-late 90s 
onwards, as the inadequacies of a conscript Bundeswehr oriented towards territorial 
defense became increasingly evident. The ability of Rühe, Scharping and Struck to 
control the flow of ideas and learning within the Defense Ministry, policy subsystem and 
at the macropolitical level had an important impact upon the success of the promotion of  
‘policy ‘stasis’. An analysis of the detail of strategic leadership also sheds doubt upon the 
utility of culturalist approaches as stand-alone explanations of policy change by drawing 
attention to the selective use of ‘strategic culture’ by policy leaders. It highlights how 
‘culture’ is not so much a cause of action as instrumental and a tool in the domestic 
political and temporal management of military reform. 
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